OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists

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Fantasy » alt.fan.tolkien » OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists

OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76640]

So, 10 Juli 2005 10:28

Yuk Tang

http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article298109.ece

Britain's top Muslim scholars are to issue a "fatwa" which will
condemn the terrorists behind Thursday's bombings, in an unprecedented
move to repudiate the Islamist militants suspected of the atrocities.

It is expected that the religious ruling, which will be drafted this
week, will effectively outlaw the bombers among Muslims by stating the
attacks were a breach of the most basic tenets of Islam.

Senior community leaders believe they must try to deflect another wave
of revenge attacks by undermining the religious basis of the
terrorists' alleged Islamist ideology and, significantly, by
questioning their right to describe themselves as Muslims

[More at link]

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76643 ]

So, 10 Juli 2005 13:26

Gort

Yuk Tang wrote:
> http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article298109.ece
>
> Britain's top Muslim scholars are to issue a "fatwa" which will
> condemn the terrorists behind Thursday's bombings, in an unprecedented
> move to repudiate the Islamist militants suspected of the atrocities.
>
> It is expected that the religious ruling, which will be drafted this
> week, will effectively outlaw the bombers among Muslims by stating the
> attacks were a breach of the most basic tenets of Islam.
>
> Senior community leaders believe they must try to deflect another wave
> of revenge attacks by undermining the religious basis of the
> terrorists' alleged Islamist ideology and, significantly, by
> questioning their right to describe themselves as Muslims
>
> [More at link]
>
>

Maybe they finally realized that "If you aren't part of the solution
you're part of the problem."

--
If you find a posting or message from myself offensive,
inappropriate, or disruptive, please ignore it. If you don't know
how to ignore a posting,complain to me and I will demonstrate.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76666 ]

So, 10 Juli 2005 19:22

"Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:Xns968F60736D507yos132000yahoocouk [at] 195.92.193.157...
> http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article298109.ece
>
> Britain's top Muslim scholars are to issue a "fatwa" which will
> condemn the terrorists behind Thursday's bombings, in an unprecedented
> move to repudiate the Islamist militants suspected of the atrocities.

> It is expected that the religious ruling, which will be drafted this
> week, will effectively outlaw the bombers among Muslims by stating the
> attacks were a breach of the most basic tenets of Islam.

Gee, I wonder why they haven't included Muslim suicide bombers who attack
Israel in the fatwa? And for that matter, I wonder why they took so long to
condemn Muslim terrorist attacks against other Western nations?

> Senior community leaders believe they must try to deflect another wave
> of revenge attacks by undermining the religious basis of the
> terrorists' alleged Islamist ideology and, significantly, by
> questioning their right to describe themselves as Muslims

Or perhaps they are simply trying to manipulate gullible Western lefties
into continuing to support Muslim extremism?

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76685 ]

So, 10 Juli 2005 23:28

Notifier Deamon

Post removed (X-No-Archive: yes)

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76697 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 02:50

"Pat" <pk [at] primenet.com> wrote in message
news:tp33d1571h90fml5jhe2e28cn374cjntt2 [at] 4ax.com...
> On Sun, 10 Jul 2005 17:22:19 GMT, "Ty" <tybeardSPAM [at] sbcglobal.net> wrote:

> >"Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >news:Xns968F60736D507yos132000yahoocouk [at] 195.92.193.157...

> >Or perhaps they are simply trying to manipulate gullible Western lefties
> >into continuing to support Muslim extremism?
> >
> >--Ty
> >
>
>
> What kind of a statement is that. This lefty certainly DOES NOT support
> Muslim extremism. In fact, I don't support any of the violence perpetrated
> by Bush extremism

So, you don't think that equating Bush with Bin Laden & Co. constitutes
support for the terrorists?

Sorry, I don't believe you. I think you *do* support the bad guys but you're
trying to hide it by pretending to be neutral.

> Hence, the unprovoked war on Iraq. Bush must jump with joy
> every time new death reports come in.

So, do you think that the majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam was still in
power?

Go ahead, answer the question.

<nonanswer predicted>

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76702 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 03:27

Flame of the West

Pat wrote:

> Here's a link you might find interesting from The American Conservative's
> site:
> http://amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html

The American Conservative opposed the Iraq war from the
very beginning, on the novel grounds that the US ought
only to fight threats to its security rather than
undertaking a global campaign to impose democracy
throughout the world. They are conservative rather than
neoconservative. Unfortunately their point of view has
few friends in Congress and none at all at the White House.
(Even the Democrats want to "stay the course", which is
why the war was off the table as an election issue in
2004.) The GOP may have to suffer an election bloodbath
before the party can be reclaimed from the neocons.

-- FotW

"If you must read newspapers and magazines at least
give yourself a mouthwash with The Lord of the Rings."

-- C.S. Lewis

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76704 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 03:48

"Flame of the West" <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote in message
news:zoWdnRpHVfx-V0zfRVn-jQ [at] comcast.com...
> Pat wrote:

> > Here's a link you might find interesting from The American
Conservative's
> > site:
> > http://amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html

> The American Conservative opposed the Iraq war from the
> very beginning, on the novel grounds that the US ought
> only to fight threats to its security rather than
> undertaking a global campaign to impose democracy
> throughout the world.

As it happens, I agree that the US should fight only where it has
significant interests. I part with the American Conservative because I
belief that it was strongly in our national interests to eliminate Saddam.
And the fact that we were also eliminating a vile scumbag was simply icing
on the cake.

Reasonable people can disagree on such a fact based argument.

But the antiwar Left doesn't argue this angle. Instead, their
self-righteousness leads them to take the hypocritical and absurd position
that it was somehow *immoral* to remove one of the greatest mass murderers
of Muslims in the last hundred years. They compound their outrageous
hypocrisy by sanctimoniously claiming to be *so* concerned about the Iraqi
people.

Yet for some reason, I can't get them to answer 2 simple questions:

1. Do you think that the majority of Iraqis wish Saddam were still in power?

2. How can you claim to be concerned about the Iraqi people, yet oppose the
removal of a butcher like Saddam?

<shrug>

They just don't have the guts to answer these two questions. Which tells us
volumes about the depth of their hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy.

> They are conservative rather than
> neoconservative. Unfortunately their point of view has
> few friends in Congress and none at all at the White House.
> (Even the Democrats want to "stay the course", which is
> why the war was off the table as an election issue in
> 2004.) The GOP may have to suffer an election bloodbath
> before the party can be reclaimed from the neocons.

You may be in for a long wait. A year is a long time in politics, but
current trends suggest to me that yet another Democrat bloodbath is in the
works for 2006. The Dems failed utterly to convince the American people that
they can be trusted to run the country in wartime. Yet instead of supporting
Bush whole-heartedly so that the war will disappear as a political issue,
the Dems are doing everything they can to keep the war alive as an issue.
And reminding the American people that they cannot be trusted to run the
country in wartime.

Of course, what can you expect when you put certifiable loons like Howard
Dean and the ever clueless Nancy Pelosi in charge of your party? If I didn't
know better, I'd say that Karl Rove was behind their selection. Add in aling
self inflicted wounds like Dick Durbin and it's hard to be optimistic that
the Dems will even manage to break even in 2006. My favorite recent stupid
Democrat trick was the recent whining about our being mean to the unlawful
combatants at Gitmo. Yeah, that Rice Pilaf and chicken is sheer torture.
They finally abandoned the strategy after some *real* inconvenient facts
(the average 15 lb weight gain among detainees, the fact that the detainees
defaced the Koran more than the guards) came out and after polls showed that
over 2/3 or the American people thought the detainees were being treated
"about right" or "better than they deserved". Still, it was a helpful
reminder of why the Dems suck at national security.

Dean and Pelosi...the gifts that keep on giving.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76707 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 04:28

Morgil

Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...

>Reasonable people can disagree on such a fact based argument.
>
>But the antiwar Left doesn't argue this angle. Instead, their
>self-righteousness leads them to take the hypocritical and absurd position
>that it was somehow *immoral* to remove one of the greatest mass murderers
>of Muslims in the last hundred years.

Removing Saddam was not immoral. The means by which it
was done were. There is nothing self-righteous or hypocritical
in saying that the end does not justify the means.

They compound their outrageous
>hypocrisy by sanctimoniously claiming to be *so* concerned about the Iraqi
>people.

It's pretty simple maths. So far removing Saddam has caused
more harm then good, and it don't look good for the future either.

The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.
Hypocrisy starts when you try to twist this plain truth around.

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76714 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 05:55

Notifier Deamon

Post removed (X-No-Archive: yes)

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76715 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 06:27

Notifier Deamon

Post removed (X-No-Archive: yes)

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76716 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 07:31

Morgil

Pat kirjoitti viestissä ...

>Bush *IS* Morgoth! or, at the least, Sauron.

Naah, that's going too far. He's more sort of a mixture of
Saruman, Feanor and the later Numenorean Kings. :-)

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76718 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 08:18

"Pat" <pk [at] primenet.com> wrote in message
news:bkp3d1lab4eq1v4d4erfqavdmmo1d5ofmn [at] 4ax.com...
> On Mon, 11 Jul 2005 00:50:14 GMT, "Ty" <tybeardSPAM [at] sbcglobal.net> wrote:

> >So, you don't think that equating Bush with Bin Laden & Co. constitutes
> >support for the terrorists?

> Not at all. I also equate the christian fundamentalist with islamist
> fundamentalist. Absolutely cut from the same cloth.

Uh huh. Seems to be a remarkable dearth of self identified Christian
terrorists killing thousands in suicide attacks.

So, do you condemn the Muslim terrorists?

> >Sorry, I don't believe you. I think you *do* support the bad guys but
you're
> >trying to hide it by pretending to be neutral.

> You're the one who supports the bad guys. The ones who created the
terrorist
> training grounds in Iraq by invading a country that posed no threat to the
> US, using lies and quarter truths to persuade the American population to
go
> along.

Ah, that's great. You *are* one of those pathetic lefty hypocrites who
support cowards who intentionally target women and children and then
cravenly hide behind their own civilians.

So, do you think that a majority of Iraqis wish Saddam were still in power?

Go ahead, coward. Answer the question.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76719 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 08:18

"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:dasl2u$3u3$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...

> Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...

> >Reasonable people can disagree on such a fact based argument.

> >But the antiwar Left doesn't argue this angle. Instead, their
> >self-righteousness leads them to take the hypocritical and absurd
position
> >that it was somehow *immoral* to remove one of the greatest mass
murderers
> >of Muslims in the last hundred years.

> Removing Saddam was not immoral. The means by which it
> was done were. There is nothing self-righteous or hypocritical
> in saying that the end does not justify the means.

Ah. And so what credible, specific alternative means was likely to have
removed him?

I predict that you will blather on about some utterly vague and unrealistic
"solution" like "the Iraqi people could have overthrown him". Uh, except
that they hadn't been able to do that in the last 30 years and there was no
evidence that they would suddenly be able to now.

See, this is the classic lefty trick. You oppose something that only an
immoral slime would oppose. So to avoid looking like an immoral slime, you
pretend to support it -- but you then impose conditions that make it
impossible to actually accomplish the goal. The sad fact is that you fool no
one except possibly yourself.

So - do you think a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were still in power?

> > They compound their outrageous
> >hypocrisy by sanctimoniously claiming to be *so* concerned about the
Iraqi
> >people.

> It's pretty simple maths. So far removing Saddam has caused
> more harm then good, and it don't look good for the future either.

Hmmn. Saddam slaughtered an average of about 30,000 people per year in his
regime. Far more if you believe the lefties' report on sanctions. So even if
the absurd "100,000 dead" figure is accepted, the Iraqis will break even in
2006. And that doesn't even take into account the fact that he can no longer
fund terrorists, destabilize the region and attempt to develop WMDs.

However, I am willing to hear how you arrive at your calculus.

> The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
> if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.

So -- and nonanswer predicted -- do you think a majority of Iraqis wish that
Saddam were still in power?

> Hypocrisy starts when you try to twist this plain truth around.

Answer that question, if you have the guts, hypocrite.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76720 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 08:18

"Pat" <pk [at] primenet.com> wrote in message
news:5lr3d11i69a421igi9cbvh96l2bm24a8g4 [at] 4ax.com...
> On Mon, 11 Jul 2005 01:48:24 GMT, "Ty" <tybeardSPAM [at] sbcglobal.net> wrote:

> >"Flame of the West" <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote in message
> >news:zoWdnRpHVfx-V0zfRVn-jQ [at] comcast.com...
> >> Pat wrote:

> >> > Here's a link you might find interesting from The American
> >Conservative's
> >> > site:
> >> > http://amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html

> >> The American Conservative opposed the Iraq war from the
> >> very beginning, on the novel grounds that the US ought
> >> only to fight threats to its security rather than
> >> undertaking a global campaign to impose democracy
> >> throughout the world.

> >As it happens, I agree that the US should fight only where it has
> >significant interests. I part with the American Conservative because I
> >belief that it was strongly in our national interests to eliminate
Saddam.
> >And the fact that we were also eliminating a vile scumbag was simply
icing
> >on the cake.

> Pray tell, what was the national interest served by invading Iraq?
Creation
> of terrorist training camps, plenty of those in Iraq now, of course none
> before the war?

Asked and answered. A search of this newsgroup will turn up numerous posts
on that topic in which I outline in great detail my response. I am simply
not interested in rehashing that with you again.

So, do you think that a majority of Iraqis wish Saddam was still in power?

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76724 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 10:40

Yuk Tang

Flame of the West <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote in
news:zoWdnRpHVfx-V0zfRVn-jQ [at] comcast.com:
> Pat wrote:
>
>> Here's a link you might find interesting from The American
>> Conservative's site:
>> http://amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html
>
> The American Conservative opposed the Iraq war from the
> very beginning, on the novel grounds that the US ought
> only to fight threats to its security rather than
> undertaking a global campaign to impose democracy
> throughout the world. They are conservative rather than
> neoconservative. Unfortunately their point of view has
> few friends in Congress and none at all at the White House.
> (Even the Democrats want to "stay the course", which is
> why the war was off the table as an election issue in
> 2004.) The GOP may have to suffer an election bloodbath
> before the party can be reclaimed from the neocons.

A 1997? Except that Thatcherites still seem to rule the Conservative
party. There's a used-to-be and would-be ruling elite that wants to
move leftwards towards the more electable centre, but the party
members won't let them. Michael Howard is currently trying to
arrange it so that this elite can pick a sensible candidate who can
reach out to non-Tories, but the rightwing candidate and his
supporters (the bulk of the party) are disgruntled at not being
allowed a general vote.

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76725 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 10:43

Yuk Tang

"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in
news:dasl2u$3u3$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi:
>
> The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
> if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.
> Hypocrisy starts when you try to twist this plain truth around.

The most relevant question is would the British have been better off if
we'd let Iraq alone. I don't mind my government going on humanitarian
missions. However, I'd expect them to be effective, and cost-
effective, with minimal chance of blowback. The Iraq affair meets none
of these criteria.

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76729 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 11:59

"Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:Xns969062F6EE84Dyos132000yahoocouk [at] 195.92.193.157...
> "Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in
> news:dasl2u$3u3$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi:

> > The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
> > if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.
> > Hypocrisy starts when you try to twist this plain truth around.

Nonanswer noted.

Although I find the assertion fascinating. I wonder if he actually meant to
say that a majority of Iraqis would be better off today if Saddam were still
in power.

> The most relevant question is would the British have been better off if
> we'd let Iraq alone.

Finally...a lefty who sees the hypocrisy. I have no quarrel with those who
claim that removing Saddam was a poor use of our resources, or that it
wasn't in our best interests to do so. I think that they are badly mistaken
and that the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the benefits of taking
Saddam down far outweigh the costs. But this is a factual issue and there is
wide room for reasonable disagreement.

My objection is to those hypocritical lefties like Morgil who actually claim
that a majority of Iraqis would be better off if Saddam were still in power.

> I don't mind my government going on humanitarian
> missions. However, I'd expect them to be effective, and cost-
> effective, with minimal chance of blowback. The Iraq affair meets none
> of these criteria.

I agree. Humanitarian reasons alone, IMHO, do not constitute sufficient
reason to put my nations soldiers in harm's way. But there were numerous
good reasons to take Saddam down, any one of which was sufficient IMHO. The
fact that he was a loathesome genocidal maniac is just a bonus.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76734 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 12:52

Jette Goldie

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76735 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 13:04

Morgil

Ty kirjoitti viestissä <1qrAe.299$Bo3.177 [at] newssvr11.news.prodigy.com>...
>"Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:Xns969062F6EE84Dyos132000yahoocouk [at] 195.92.193.157...
>> "Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in
>> news:dasl2u$3u3$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi:
>
>> > The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
>> > if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.
>> > Hypocrisy starts when you try to twist this plain truth around.
>
>Nonanswer noted.
>
>Although I find the assertion fascinating. I wonder if he actually meant to
>say that a majority of Iraqis would be better off today if Saddam were
still
>in power.

Finally you begin to see the light. Amazing as it may sound,
yes they would. Amazing because it truly demonstrates how
badly the Americans screwed up the occupation. Security
situation has not improved one inch from what it was before
the invasion, the average nutrition level has gone down, most
people *still* get electric power on irregular basis. The only
actual improvement is that sanctions have been lifted, but on
the downside 100000 people who wouldn't have to be, are dead.

So now that you know the bitter truth, answer this...

Don't you think the Iraqis would have been better off without USA?

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76738 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 13:43

Morgil

Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...
>"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:dasl2u$3u3$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...
>
>> Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...
>
>> >Reasonable people can disagree on such a fact based argument.
>
>> >But the antiwar Left doesn't argue this angle. Instead, their
>> >self-righteousness leads them to take the hypocritical and absurd
>position
>> >that it was somehow *immoral* to remove one of the greatest mass
>murderers
>> >of Muslims in the last hundred years.
>
>> Removing Saddam was not immoral. The means by which it
>> was done were. There is nothing self-righteous or hypocritical
>> in saying that the end does not justify the means.
>
>Ah. And so what credible, specific alternative means was likely to have
>removed him?

That is irrelevant. If there are no acceptable means that would
be justified by the situation at hand, it does not make it okay
to use unacceptable means.

>> > They compound their outrageous
>> >hypocrisy by sanctimoniously claiming to be *so* concerned about the
>Iraqi
>> >people.
>
>> It's pretty simple maths. So far removing Saddam has caused
>> more harm then good, and it don't look good for the future either.
>
>Hmmn. Saddam slaughtered an average of about 30,000 people per year in his
>regime. Far more if you believe the lefties' report on sanctions. So even
if
>the absurd "100,000 dead" figure is accepted, the Iraqis will break even in
>2006. And that doesn't even take into account the fact that he can no
longer
>fund terrorists, destabilize the region and attempt to develop WMDs.
>
>However, I am willing to hear how you arrive at your calculus.

The number of people Saddam was killing annually is currently
more or less even to the number that insurgents, terrorists and
US soldiers are killing annually. There is no improvement on
the security of Iraqis and no improvement on the average quality
of life either, which could have been improved simply by lifting
the sanctions. Until that all changes, Iraqis won't even start to
"break even", even if your absurd numbers were correct.

>> The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
>> if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.
>
>So -- and nonanswer predicted -- do you think a majority of Iraqis wish
that
>Saddam were still in power?

No, but that's mostly because they know that if Saddam was still
in power, the Americans would continue to punish them all with
sanctions and random bombings, etc.

Now answer these questions, you dodging coward.

Are the majority of Iraqis doing any better since Saddam was
removed from power?

Do you think that the majority of Iraqis think that they would be
better off if America had just left them alone?

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76739 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 14:01

"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:datjbe$cb7$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...
> Ty kirjoitti viestissä <1qrAe.299$Bo3.177 [at] newssvr11.news.prodigy.com>...

> >Although I find the assertion fascinating. I wonder if he actually meant
to
> >say that a majority of Iraqis would be better off today if Saddam were
> still
> >in power.

> Finally you begin to see the light. Amazing as it may sound,
> yes they would.

So the 80% of the Iraqi people who were systematically brutalized by Saddam
and the Sunni Arab minority are worse off today than they'd be if Saddam and
his murderous sons were still in power?

Do you think that a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were still in power?

And what do you base this opinion on? Specifics please.

> Amazing because it truly demonstrates how
> badly the Americans screwed up the occupation. Security
> situation has not improved one inch from what it was before
> the invasion

Evidence?

> the average nutrition level has gone down

Credible, specific evidence that it is worse overall than it was under
Saddam?

> most
> people *still* get electric power on irregular basis.

Credible, specific evidence that it is worse overall than it was under
Saddam?

> ...100000 people who wouldn't have to be, are dead.

A number that is not conceded. But even if it were, it compares favorably to
the ~30,000 that Saddam killed on average each year...

> So now that you know the bitter truth, answer this...

No, you have only made bald assertions and you *still* refuse to answer the
question that I have asked 10+ times.

Do you think that a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were still in power?

Answer the question please.

> Don't you think the Iraqis would have been better off without USA?

Of course not.

1. They are rid of the greatest mass murderer of Muslims in the last 100
years.

2. They have begun the process toward democracy.

3. Their economy is booming. The Iraqi GDP grew 20% in 2003. The World Bank
projects a grown rate of 30-70% in 2004. At that rate, Iraqis will double
their income every 1.7 years. I particularly liked this quote " "Each day
today is worth 10 years under Saddam," says Abdul Reza Ougla, 48, a truck
driver who cruises south Baghdad's Karada commercial district looking for
merchants who need him to haul something somewhere. He earns 40,000 Iraqi
dinars (about $28) a day, up from 15,000 under Saddam." Sources:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm ;
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-03-28-iraq-econ omy_x.htm

http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2004-02-19-iraqecon_x.ht m :
U.S. occupation authorities estimate Iraqis have imported 1 million cars and
trucks and more than 500,000 satellite dishes since fighting ended in April,
Taylor said.

Other signs of improvement:

..Oil revenue. On an annualized basis, oil exports are running $1.5 billion
ahead of projections by U.S. authorities and Iraqi technocrats, who forecast
2004 revenue at $12 billion.

..The currency. Iraq's new dinar, introduced in October, has gained value
against the U.S. dollar. U.S. officials originally worried Iraq could
deplete its foreign currency reserves if Iraqis weren't confident in the
dinar.

Looks like they're doing *much* better than they they were under Saddam.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #76740 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 14:01

"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:datlla$fqf$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...

> >So -- and nonanswer predicted -- do you think a majority of Iraqis wish
> >that
> >Saddam were still in power?

> No, but that's mostly because they know that if Saddam was still
> in power, the Americans would continue to punish them all with
> sanctions and random bombings, etc.

Finally, the lunatic answers the question. You claim that the Iraqis would
be better off if Saddam were still in power, yet you concede that the
majority of Iraqis would disagree with you.

Why should we believe you over the Iraqis? Do you live in Iraq?

And you are apparently so ignorant that you fail to recall that the
sanctions were imposed by your beloved United Nations and voted for by the
UK, France, Russia, China, and the US. So the United Nations imposed
sanctions. And why don't you morons blame Saddam for the sanctions? All he
had to do was comply with UN Security Council resolutions -- which he agreed
to do. Yet he refused to do so, knowing full well that sanctions would
follow. Tell us all why this isn't Saddam's fault?

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78124 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 15:04

Yuk Tang

"Jette Goldie" <jet [at] blueyonder.com.uk> wrote in news:nbsAe.67354
$G8.47006 [at] text.news.blueyonder.co.uk:
> "Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:Xns969062F6EE84Dyos132000yahoocouk [at] 195.92.193.157...
>> "Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in
>> news:dasl2u$3u3$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi:
>> >
>> > The only relevant question is would the Iraqis be better off
>> > if America had just left them alone, and the answer is - yes.
>> > Hypocrisy starts when you try to twist this plain truth around.
>>
>> The most relevant question is would the British have been better
>> off
>> if
>> we'd let Iraq alone. I don't mind my government going on
>> humanitarian
>> missions. However, I'd expect them to be effective, and cost-
>> effective, with minimal chance of blowback. The Iraq affair meets
>> none
>> of these criteria.
>
> To be honest, I think that even if Britain hadn't gotten involved
> in the Iraq thing, Thursday's events were inevitable. It's all
> part of a pattern.

I don't deny that, I've never said that these attacks were a
consequence of Iraq. It's only the likes of Ty who keep linking the
struggle with OBL with Iraq. Londoners' opposition to the Iraq war
were based mainly on traditional diplomatic values, ie. they hadn't
attacked us so why should we attack them, and anyway attacking them
doesn't gain us anything etc.

Fwiw, these attacks were going to happen sooner or later. Iraq may
have given them an additional excuse for it, but an excuse is just an
excuse. I'd rather my government focused on something more
substantial.

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78130 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 16:11

"Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message

> I don't deny that, I've never said that these attacks were a
> consequence of Iraq. It's only the likes of Ty who keep linking the
> struggle with OBL with Iraq.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/00 0/005/804yqqnr.a
sp?pg=1

Again, I don't usually post articles wholesale, but I tire of wasting time
exposing your patent lies...

This article flatly contradicts your religious belief that there was no
evidence of any connection between Iraq and Al Queda...

The Mother of All Connections
From the July 18, 2005 issue: A special report on the new evidence of
collaboration between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda.
by Stephen F. Hayes & Thomas Joscelyn

"In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi
Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and
British embassies with chemical mortars."

U.S. government "Summary of Evidence" for an Iraqi member of al Qaeda
detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
FOR MANY, the debate over the former Iraqi regime's ties to Osama bin
Laden's al Qaeda network ended a year ago with the release of the 9/11
Commission report. Media outlets seized on a carefully worded summary that
the commission had found no evidence "indicating that Iraq cooperated with
al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United
States" and ran blaring headlines like the one on the June 17, 2004, front
page of the New York Times: "Panel Finds No Qaeda-Iraq Tie."

But this was woefully imprecise. It assumed, not unreasonably, that the 9/11
Commission's conclusion was based on a firm foundation of intelligence
reporting, that the intelligence community had the type of human
intelligence and other reporting that would allow senior-level analysts to
draw reasonable conclusions. We know now that was not the case.
John Lehman, a 9/11 commissioner, spoke to The Weekly Standard at the time
the report was released. "There may well be--and probably will
be--additional intelligence coming in from interrogations and from analysis
of captured records and so forth which will fill out the intelligence
picture. This is not phrased as--nor meant to be--the definitive word on
Iraqi Intelligence activities."

Lehman's caution was prescient. A year later, we still cannot begin
to offer a "definitive" picture of the relationships entered into by Saddam
Hussein's operatives, but much more has already been learned from documents
uncovered after the Iraq war. The evidence we present below, compiled from
revelations in recent months, suggests an acute case of denial on the part
of those who dismiss the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship.
There could hardly be a clearer case--of the ongoing revelations and the
ongoing denial--than in the 13 points below, reproduced verbatim from a
"Summary of Evidence" prepared by the U.S. government in November 2004. This
unclassified document was released by the Pentagon in late March 2005. It
details the case for designating an Iraqi member of al Qaeda, currently
detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as an "enemy combatant."

1. From 1987 to 1989, the detainee served as an infantryman in the Iraqi
Army and received training on the mortar and rocket propelled grenades.

2. A Taliban recruiter in Baghdad convinced the detainee to travel to
Afghanistan to join the Taliban in 1994.

3. The detainee admitted he was a member of the Taliban.

4. The detainee pledged allegiance to the supreme leader of the Taliban to
help them take over all of Afghanistan.

5. The Taliban issued the detainee a Kalishnikov rifle in November 2000.

6. The detainee worked in a Taliban ammo and arms storage arsenal in
Mazar-Es-Sharif organizing weapons and ammunition.

7. The detainee willingly associated with al Qaida members.

8. The detainee was a member of al Qaida.

9. An assistant to Usama Bin Ladin paid the detainee on three separate
occasions between 1995 and 1997.

10. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp in Darwanta, Afghanistan,
where he received 1,000 Rupees to continue his travels.

11. From 1997 to 1998, the detainee acted as a trusted agent for Usama Bin
Ladin, executing three separate reconnaissance missions for the al Qaeda
leader in Oman, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

12. In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi
Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and
British embassies with chemical mortars.

13. Detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Khudzar, Pakistan, in
July 2002.

Interesting. What's more interesting: The alleged plot was to have taken
place in August 1998, the same month that al Qaeda attacked two U.S.
embassies in East Africa. And more interesting still: It was to have taken
place in the same month that the Clinton administration publicly accused
Iraq of supplying al Qaeda with chemical weapons expertise and material.
But none of this was interesting enough for any of the major television
networks to cover it. Nor was it deemed sufficiently newsworthy to merit a
mention in either the Washington Post or the New York Times.

The Associated Press, on the other hand, probably felt obliged to run a
story, since the "Summary of Evidence" was released in response to a Freedom
of Information Act request filed by the AP itself. But after briefly
describing the documents, the AP article downplayed its own scoop with a
sentence almost as amusing as it is inane: "There is no indication the
Iraqi's alleged terror-related activities were on behalf of Saddam Hussein's
government, other than the brief mention of him traveling to Pakistan with a
member of Iraqi intelligence." That sentence minimizing the importance of
the findings was enough, apparently, to convince most newspaper editors
around the country not to run the AP story.
It's possible, of course, that the evidence presented by military
prosecutors is exaggerated, maybe even wrong. The evidence required to
designate a detainee an "enemy combatant" is lower than the "reasonable
doubt" standard of U.S. criminal prosecutions. So there is much we don't
know.

Indeed,
more than two years after the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was ousted,
there is much we do not know about the relationship between Iraq and al
Qaeda. We do know, however, that there was one. We know about this
relationship not from Bush administration assertions but from internal Iraqi
Intelligence Service (IIS) documents recovered in Iraq after the
war--documents that have been authenticated by a U.S. intelligence community
long hostile to the very idea that any such relationship exists.

We know from these IIS documents that beginning in 1992 the former Iraqi
regime regarded bin Laden as an Iraqi Intelligence asset. We know from IIS
documents that the former Iraqi regime provided safe haven and financial
support to an Iraqi who has admitted to mixing the chemicals for the 1993
attack on the World Trade Center. We know from IIS documents that Saddam
Hussein agreed to Osama bin Laden's request to broadcast anti-Saudi
propaganda on Iraqi state-run television. We know from IIS documents that a
"trusted confidante" of bin Laden stayed for more than two weeks at a posh
Baghdad hotel as the guest of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

We have been told by Hudayfa Azzam, the son of bin Laden's longtime mentor
Abdullah Azzam, that Saddam Hussein welcomed young al Qaeda members "with
open arms" before the war, that they "entered Iraq in large numbers, setting
up an organization to confront the occupation," and that the regime
"strictly and directly" controlled their activities. We have been told by
Jordan's King Abdullah that his government knew Abu Musab al Zarqawi was in
Iraq before the war and requested that the former Iraqi regime deport him.
We have been told by Time magazine that confidential documents from
Zarqawi's group, recovered in recent raids, indicate other jihadists had
joined him in Baghdad before the Hussein regime fell. We have been told by
one of those jihadists that he was with Zarqawi in Baghdad before the war.
We have been told by Ayad Allawi, former Iraqi prime minister and a longtime
CIA source, that other Iraqi Intelligence documents indicate bin Laden's top
deputy was in Iraq for a jihadist conference in September 1999.

All of this is new--information obtained since the fall of the Hussein
regime. And yet critics of the Iraq war and many in the media refuse to see
it. Just two weeks ago, President Bush gave a prime-time speech on Iraq.
Among his key points: Iraq is a central front in the global war on terror
that began on September 11. Bush spoke in very general terms. He did not
mention any of this new information on Iraqi support for terrorism to make
his case. That didn't matter to many journalists and critics of the war.

CNN anchor Carol Costello claimed "there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein
was connected in any way to al Qaeda." The charitable explanation is
ignorance. Jay Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat who serves as vice
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, knows better. Before the war
he pointed to Zarqawi's presence in Iraq as a "substantial connection
between Iraq and al Qaeda." And yet he, too, now insists that Saddam
Hussein's regime "had nothing to do with Osama bin Laden, it had nothing to
do with al Qaeda."

Such comments reveal far more about politics in America than they do about
the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship.

* * *

"Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little
useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi
regime's possible links to al Qaeda."

Senate Intelligence Committee report, July 7, 2004

UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE IRAQ WAR, the consensus view within the U.S.
intelligence community was simple: Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were
natural enemies who, despite their common interests, would not work
together. Daniel Benjamin, a senior counterterrorism official in the Clinton
administration, summarized this view in a New York Times op-ed on September
30, 2002. He wrote: "Saddam Hussein has long recognized that al Qaeda and
like-minded Islamists represent a threat to his regime. Consequently, he has
shown no interest in working with them against their common enemy, the
United States. This was the understanding of American intelligence in the
1990s."

Benjamin later elaborated in an interview with Mother Jones. "In 1998, we
went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a
link [between] al Qaeda and Iraq. We came to the conclusion that our
intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship
between al Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact."

Judith Yaphe, a longtime CIA analyst on the Middle East and Iraq, was only
slightly less categorical in testimony before the House Armed Service
Committee on April 21, 2004. "I know that there's a small number of people
who say that Saddam was working cooperatively with al Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden. I do not believe that. I know the intelligence is not there."
Yaphe was right about one thing: The intelligence was not there. The CIA's
collection against the Iraqi target was abysmal. According to former CIA
director George Tenet, the U.S. intelligence community never penetrated the
senior ranks of the former Iraqi regime. Bob Woodward of the Washington Post
explored this subject in his book on the Iraq war, Plan of Attack. Woodward
interviewed "Saul," the chief of the Iraqi Operations Group, at the CIA.

Saul was discovering that the CIA reporting sources inside Iraq were pretty
thin. What was thin? "I can count them on one hand," Saul said, pausing for
effect, "and I can still pick my nose." There were four. And those sources
were in Iraqi ministries such as foreign affairs and oil that were on the
periphery of any penetration of Saddam's inner circle.
Woodward reports that the Iraqi Operations Group was known inside the CIA's
Near East Division as "The House of Broken Toys." "It was largely populated
with new, green [Directorate of Operations] officers and problem officers,
or old boys waiting for retirement. . . . Past operations read almost like a
handbook for failed and stupid covert action. It was a catalogue of doomed
work--too little, too late, too seat-of-the-pants, too little planning, too
little realism. The comic mixed with the frightening."

The Senate Select Intelligence Committee did not find it so amusing. The
committee's bipartisan report was released last summer. Most of the
attention at the time focused on the report's assessment of flaws in
intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The lengthy
section on "Iraq's Links to Terrorism" received considerably less attention.
What emerges in the 66 pages of the report is a picture of an intelligence
community with a woefully inadequate collection capability on the Iraqi
target. In some ways more disturbing, though, was the lack of interest. In a
stunning moment of candor, an "IC analyst" provided this characterization of
the collection effort on Iraq: "I don't think we were really focused on the
CT [counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the IIS
[Iraqi Intelligence Service] going out and proactively conducting terrorist
attacks. It wasn't until we realized that there was the possibility of going
to war that we had to get a handle on that."

So on the one hand we know that there was virtually no human intelligence on
Iraq and terrorism. Yet the intelligence community, if this analyst is to be
believed, was so confident in its assessment that Iraqi Intelligence was not
in the terrorism business that collecting on that target was tantamount to
cramming for a test.

The Senate report's conclusions were devastating:

Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little
useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi
regime's possible links to al Qaeda. . . . The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy
targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no [redacted]
sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism.
It was not just reporting on Iraq that was inadequate. "The CIA had no
[redacted] credible reporting on the leadership of either the Iraqi regime
or al Qaeda, which would have enabled it to better define a cooperative
relationship, if any did in fact exist."

This left policymakers in a bind. There was reporting on the relationship
between Iraq and al Qaeda, but much of it was secondhand. This reporting was
supplemented by widespread coverage of the Iraq-al Qaeda connection in "open
sources," including the amnesiac American press. And contrary to the
assessments coming from many analysts in the intelligence community, much of
this reporting seemed to indicate a significant relationship.

The difference between most intelligence community analysts and Bush
administration policymakers can be found in how they interpret the gaps. The
analysts seemed to assume, despite the history of poor collection, that the
many Iraq-al Qaeda contacts reported in intelligence products and open
sources were anomalous. To them, the gaps in reporting simply reflected a
lack of activity. Policymakers (and a small number of analysts) took a
different view. The gaps in reporting on Iraq and al Qaeda were just that:
gaps in reporting. To this group, the many reports of contacts, training,
and offers of safe haven were indicative of a relationship that ran much
deeper.

After September 11, the mere existence of a long relationship between Iraq
and al Qaeda had to be considered an urgent threat.

* * *

"Attack them our beloved people. You are the glory of our nation. Attack
them. . . . The Mother of all Battles is not the past."

Saddam Hussein, January 17, 1993

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY was apparently not much concerned by Iraqi
support for terrorism in the 13 years between the Gulf war and the Iraq war.
To students of Iraq-U.S. relations that might seem bizarre. Saddam Hussein
had used such asymmetric warfare for decades, against enemies foreign and
domestic, real and imagined. What's more, he had demonstrated his
willingness to use terrorism and terrorist surrogates against his enemies
when confronted by superior conventional military forces during the Gulf
war. By some accounts, more than 1,400 terrorists made their way to Baghdad
in the final months of 1990 as he prepared to face the coalition assembled
by the United States to oust him from Kuwait. He dispatched others to attack
U.S. interests around the world. On January 18, 1991, one day after the Gulf
war began, an Iraqi terrorist posing as a day laborer managed to plant 26
sticks of TNT in a flower box below a window of the U.S. ambassador's
residence in Jakarta, Indonesia. The dynamite wasn't completely buried, and
a gardener found it before the bomb exploded. The following day in the
Philippines, two Iraqis blew themselves up in a plot known to CIA veterans
as Operation Dogmeat, a botched attempt to bomb the U.S. Information Service
headquarters at the Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Manila. The failed
attack on the U.S. government-run center received the active support of the
Iraqi ambassador to the Philippines.

Saddam Hussein openly encouraged these attacks. "It remains for us to tell
all Arabs, all militant believers . . . wherever they may be that it is your
duty to embark on holy war. You should target their interests wherever they
may be," he said on January 20, 1991.

Iraq's use of terrorism was so widespread, in fact, that it became an issue
in the 1992 presidential campaign, when Al Gore accused the first Bush
administration of a "blatant disregard for brutal terrorism" practiced by
Hussein and ignoring Iraq's "extensive terrorism activities."

Many Islamic radicals voiced opposition to Saddam Hussein after he invaded
Kuwait. Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi was not one of them. Turabi's willingness to
back Hussein gave the Iraqi dictator the Islamist street credibility he
would exploit for years to come. In the debate over the former Iraqi
regime's relationship with al Qaeda, it is often said that Saddam's secular
Baathist regime could never work with Osama bin Laden's radical Islamist
organization. It is a curious argument since Turabi, one of Saddam's
staunchest allies, also happened to be one of the most influential Islamists
of the past two decades. One of the principal architects of Sudan's Islamist
revolution in 1989, Turabi was also the longtime mentor, friend, and host of
Osama bin Laden during his stay in Sudan from 1992 until 1996.

Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden approached the Saudi
regime and offered to lead Muslim forces in driving Saddam out of Kuwait.
Many who downplay the relationship between the former Iraqi regime and al
Qaeda point to this as an example of the hostility between Hussein and bin
Laden. But Osama's spurned offer is only part of the story. While bin
Laden's first instinct may have been to oppose the secular tyrant, his
soon-to-be host in Sudan did not share these sentiments. According to an
interview at the time with Turabi's cousin, Mudawi Turabi, the Sudanese
leader met twice with Saddam Hussein before the Gulf war and "had appeared
to be designing his own Islamic empire even then."
In October 1990, Turabi led a delegation of Islamists to Jordan to meet with
Iraqi government officials. Bin Laden sent emissaries to this meeting as
well. While it is not clear what bin Laden's emissaries or bin Laden himself
thought of the meeting, it is clear that Turabi threw his full support
behind Saddam. In a press conference after the meeting, Turabi warned "there
is going to be all forms of jihad all over the world because it is an issue
of foreign troops on sacred soil."
Turabi continued in his self-designated role as pan-Islamic leader by
convening terrorist confabs in Khartoum known euphemistically as the Popular
Arab Islamic Conference. Encouraged by Turabi, Saddam began hosting his own
Popular Islamic Conference in Baghdad. The conferences shared a central
purpose: to bring together Islamic and secular radicals from around the
world to oppose U.S. involvement in the Gulf war and the continued presence
of American troops on Saudi soil.

The Baghdad conferences, which were held annually until the regime fell,
were filled with the rhetoric of jihad. A statement issued at the closing
ceremony of the 1992 conference was a call to arms. The 500 Islamists in
attendance affirmed "that maintaining and defending the unity of Iraq's
land, people and sovereignty is an Islamic duty that must be performed
because Iraq is the fortress of Islamic jihad targeted by the atheist
forces." The statement called on Islamic groups "to meet and discuss the
establishment [of] a free world front to confront the U.S. hegemony and its
new world order."
Newsweek reporter Christopher Dickey attended a Popular Islamic Conference
at Baghdad's al Rashid Hotel and later recalled: "If that was not a
fledgling al Qaeda at the Rashid convention, it sure was Saddam's version of
it."
We do not yet know how many future al Qaeda leaders attended the
conferences. (We do know that the conferences were carried on Iraqi
state-run television and that the attendees signed the closing statements. A
comparison of those lists with known al Qaeda terrorists would be an
interesting and potentially productive undertaking, as would a careful
review of any photographic evidence from the session.) By this time,
however, it appears that Hussein had already forged relationships with the
two men who would later lead al Qaeda.

An internal Iraqi Intelligence memo dated March 28, 1992, lists individuals
Hussein's regime considered assets of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Osama
bin Laden is listed on page 14. The Iraqis describe him as a Saudi
businessman who "is in good relationship with our section in Syria."

At the same time, the Iraqis were cultivating a relationship with Ayman al
Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the current top deputy to
bin Laden. According to Qassem Hussein Mohammed, a 20-year veteran of Iraqi
Intelligence, Zawahiri visited Baghdad in 1992 for a meeting with Hussein.
In a 2002 interview with the New Yorker's Jeffrey Goldberg from a Kurdish
prison in northeastern Iraq, the IIS veteran described his duties as a
bodyguard for Zawahiri during his visit. This was not Zawahiri's only
meeting with top Iraqi officials. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a
senior Iraqi Intelligence official, Zawahiri met with Iraqi Intelligence
officials in Sudan several times from 1992 to 1995. A foreign intelligence
service has corroborated that report, adding that at one of those meetings
Zawahiri received blank Yemeni passports from an Iraqi Intelligence
official.

In 1993, at Turabi's urging, bin Laden came to an "understanding" with
Saddam Hussein that the al Qaeda leader and his followers would not engage
in any anti-Hussein activities. The Clinton administration later included
this development in its sealed indictment of bin Laden in 1998. According to
the indictment: "Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of
Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on
particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda
would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."

* * *

"Abdul Rahman Yasin, a fugitive of the [1993 World Trade Center] attack, is
of Iraqi descent, and in 1993, he fled to Iraq with Iraqi assistance."

Senate Intelligence Committee report

ON FEBRUARY 26, 1993, a powerful bomb exploded in the garage of the World
Trade Center in New York City. The attack killed six and injured more than
1,000. It could have been much worse. The bombers hoped to topple one tower
into the other. The men responsible for the attack aimed to kill tens of
thousands of Americans.

One of those men was Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi who had come to the United
States six months before the attack. In the days after the attack, Yasin was
detained twice by the FBI. Although he admitted his role in the bombing and
offered investigators details of the plot, he was inexplicably released.
Twice. The second time the FBI even drove him home.

According to the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report,
Yasin promptly "fled to Iraq with Iraqi assistance." His travel was arranged
by the second secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan. In 1994, a
reporter for ABC News went to the home of Yasin's father in Baghdad and
spoke with neighbors who reported that Yasin was free to come and go as he
pleased and was "working for the government."

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Iraqi regime denied any relationship
with Yasin and any knowledge of his whereabouts. In an interview with PBS's
Frontline that aired on October 29, 2001, Iraq's U.N. ambassador denied that
Yasin was even in Iraq. "To my knowledge he is not, and there is not any
relation with him." Pressed, the Iraqi diplomat went further. "Absolutely. I
know that there is no relation with that guy. . . . We have no relations
with these kind of guys, with all persons who are involved in terrorism."

Eight months later, on June 2, 2002, the Iraqi government abruptly changed
its story. Tariq Aziz, for years the face of the Iraqi regime in the Western
media, appeared on 60 Minutes and assured Lesley Stahl that Yasin had been
imprisoned since his return to Iraq. Aziz claimed that the Iraqi regime held
Yasin prisoner because they worried that the United States would blame Iraq
for the attack if he was returned to America to face trial. Yasin himself
appeared. He admitted to mixing the chemicals for the bomb. He showed
viewers a scar on his leg that he claimed to have gotten preparing chemicals
for the attack. He even apologized. Stahl did not ask about the Frontline
interview or previous media reports that Yasin was living freely in Baghdad.

We now know more about Yasin's stay in Baghdad. "We know, for example, in
connection with the original World Trade Center bombing in '93 that one of
the bombers was Iraqi, returned to Iraq after the attack of '93," Vice
President Dick Cheney told Tim Russert in a September 14, 2003, appearance
on Meet the Press. "And we've learned subsequent to that, since we went into
Baghdad and got into the intelligence files, that this individual probably
also received financing from the Iraqi government as well as safe haven.
Now, is there a connection between the Iraqi government and the original
World Trade Center bombing in '93? We know, as I say, that one of the
perpetrators of that act did, in fact, receive support from the Iraqi
government after the fact."

Those documents are now in possession of the FBI. Despite requests for
declassification of the documents from both Cheney's office and the
Pentagon, the FBI refuses to release them. In March, The Weekly Standard
requested an interview with FBI officials to discuss the Iraqi intelligence
documents and the status of the Yasin case. The request was denied last
week. An FBI spokeswoman said FBI officials refuse to discuss Yasin. Yasin
remains on the FBI's "Most Wanted Terrorists" list and is believed to be
still in Iraq. If there is a good reason to keep these historical documents
classified, the FBI declined to provide it.

Just two months after the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the Iraqi
Intelligence Service attempted to assassinate former President George H.W.
Bush. The IIS recruited a male nurse from Najaf as a suicide bomber to kill
the former president on a trip to Kuwait. The plot was foiled when Kuwaiti
police, thinking they had broken up a smuggling ring, learned of the Iraqi
plans. The Clinton administration responded by bombing an empty Iraqi
Intelligence Service headquarters at night.

* * *

"Cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop
freely through discussion and agreement."
Internal Iraqi Intelligence memo on Iraq-al Qaeda cooperation, June 25,
2004, New York Times

THE RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED with high-level meetings throughout 1994 and
1995. The 9/11 Commission staff report that made headlines last year by
declaring that such meetings between Iraq and al Qaeda "do not appear to
have resulted in a collaborative relationship" also reported that the
Sudanese government arranged for "contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda." The
staff report continued: "A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made
three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said
to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance
in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded."

That senior Iraqi intelligence officer was Faruq Hijazi, former deputy
director of Iraqi Intelligence and longtime regime liaison to al Qaeda.
According to several Bush administration officials with access to his
debriefings, as well as a top secret Pentagon summary of intelligence on
Iraq and al Qaeda known as the Feith Memo, Hijazi described a face-to-face
meeting with bin Laden that took place in 1994. The language in the Feith
Memo corresponds closely to that in the 9/11 Commission staff report.
"During a May 2003 custodial interview with Faruq Hijazi, he said in a 1994
meeting with bin Laden in the Sudan, bin Laden requested that Iraq assist al
Qaeda with the procurement of an unspecified number of Chinese-manufactured
antiship limpet mines. Bin Laden thought that Iraq should be able to procure
the mines through third-country intermediaries for ultimate delivery to al
Qaeda. Hijazi said he was under orders from Saddam only to listen to bin
Laden's requests and then report back to him. Bin Laden also requested the
establishment of al Qaeda training camps inside Iraq."

An internal Iraqi Intelligence document obtained by the New York Times
provides a window into the state of the relationship during the mid-1990s. A
team of Pentagon analysts concluded that the document "appears authentic."
The memo reports that a Sudanese government official met with Uday Hussein
and the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1994 and reported that
Bin Laden was willing to meet in Sudan. As a consequence, according to the
Iraqi document, bin Laden was "approached by our side" after "presidential
approval" for the liaison was given. The former head of Iraqi Intelligence
Directorate 4 met with bin Laden on February 19, 1995. The document further
states that bin Laden "had some reservations about being labeled an Iraqi
operative."

But the absence of a formal relationship hardly precludes cooperation, as
the document makes clear. Bin Laden requested that Iraq's state-run
television network broadcast anti-Saudi propaganda; the document indicates
that the Iraqis agreed to do this. The al Qaeda leader also proposed "joint
operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabia. There is no response
provided in the documents. When bin Laden leaves Sudan for Afghanistan in
May 1996, the Iraqis seek "other channels through which to handle the
relationship, in light of his current location." The IIS memo directs that
"cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop
freely through discussion and agreement."

There are other reports of varying reliability of Iraqi support for al Qaeda
during the mid-1990s. One senior al Qaeda operative in U.S. custody since
1995, Wali Khan Amin Shah, told FBI interrogators that an al Qaeda leader
named Abu Hajer al Iraqi maintained a good relationship with Iraqi
Intelligence. Abu Hajer al Iraqi ran al Qaeda's WMD procurement operation
until his capture in 1998 and was described by another al Qaeda member as
Osama bin Laden's "best friend." According to the Senate Intelligence
Committee report, Wali Khan testified that he had knowledge of two "direct
meetings" between the leadership of Iraqi Intelligence and Abu Hajer al
Iraqi.

According to the presentation at the United Nations Security Council by
Colin Powell on February 5, 2003, an al Qaeda member named Abu Abdullah al
Iraqi received training in chemical and biological weapons in Iraq beginning
in 1997. The information comes from another high-ranking al Qaeda detainee
named Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who ran bin Laden's notorious Khalden Camp outside
of Kandahar. Said Powell: "The support that [al-Libi] describes included
Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al Qaeda
associates, beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abu
Abdullah al-Iraqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000
for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdullah al-Iraqi characterized the
relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as 'successful.'" Al-Libi's
reporting also formed the basis of several statements from CIA Director
George Tenet.

Al-Libi has since recanted some of the information he provided. The debate
about whether to give more credence to his original statement or his
retraction continues. But the Senate Intelligence Committee report concluded
that the terrorism section of Powell's speech "was carefully vetted by both
terrorism and regional analysts" and that it did not differ "in any
significant way" from earlier published CIA assessments.

* * *

"To gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his
envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden, the Saudi opposition leader,
about the future of our relationship with him, and to achieve a direct
meeting with him."
Internal Iraqi Intelligence memo describing the goal of meetings with an al
Qaeda envoy, February 19, 1998
BY ALL ACCOUNTS, the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda intensified in
1998. The Iraqis were growing more obdurate in their confrontation with the
U.N. weapons inspectors, at times simply refusing to grant access to
suspected weapons sites. The United States was losing patience--both with
Iraq and with U.N. fecklessness. Al Qaeda, meanwhile, had found a home in
Afghanistan and was turning out terrorists from its camps by the thousands.

On February 3, 1998, Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's Egyptian deputy, came to
Baghdad for meetings with Iraqi leaders. The visit came as Islamic radicals
gathered once again in the Iraqi capital for another installation of
Hussein's Popular Islamic Conferences. Iraqi vice president Taha Yasin
Ramadan welcomed them on February 9 with the language of jihad:
The Islamic nation's ulema, advocates and preachers, are called upon to
carry out a jihad that God wants them to carry out through honest words in
order to expose the U.S. and Zionist regimes to the world peoples, to
explain facts, and to say what is right and to call for it. This is their
religious duty. The Muslim ulema are called upon before Almighty God to act
among the Muslim ranks to confront the infidel U.S. moves and to raise their
voices against the U.S.-Zionist evil.
We do not have reporting on when, exactly, Zawahiri left Baghdad. But we do
know from an interrogation of a senior Iraqi Intelligence official that he
did not leave empty-handed. As first reported in U.S. News & World Report,
the Iraqi regime gave Zawahiri $300,000 during or shortly after his trip to
Baghdad.

On February 17, 1998, Bill Clinton traveled the short distance from the
White House to the Pentagon to prepare the nation for a confrontation with
Iraq. The symbolism was obvious, the rhetoric belligerent. Clinton explained
why "meeting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is important to our security
in the new era we are entering." He warned about the threats from the
"predators of the 21st century," rogue states working with terrorist groups.
"There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq."
War seemed imminent.

Two days later, on February 19, the Iraqi Intelligence Service finalized
plans to bring a "trusted confidant" of bin Laden's to Baghdad in early
March. The revelation came in documents discovered after the Iraq war by
journalists Mitch Potter of the Toronto Star and Inigo Gilmore of the Sunday
Telegraph. The U.S. intelligence community is now in possession of these
documents and has assessed that they are authentic. The documents--a series
of communiqués between Iraqi Intelligence divisions--provide another window
into the relationship between the former Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. The
following comes from the Telegraph's translations of the documents.

The envoy is a trusted confidant and known by them. According to the above
mediation we request official permission to call Khartoum station to
facilitate the travel arrangements for the above-mentioned person to Iraq.
And that our body carry all the travel and hotel expenses inside Iraq to
gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy
an oral message from us to bin Laden, the Saudi opposition leader, about the
future of our relationship with him, and to achieve a direct meeting with
him.

A note at the bottom of the page from the director of one IIS division
recommends approving the request, noting, "we may find in this envoy a way
to maintain contacts with bin Laden."

Four days later, on February 23, final approval is granted. "The permission
of Mr. Deputy Director of Intelligence has been gained on 21 February for
this operation, to secure a reservation for one of the intelligence services
guests for one week in one of the first class hotels," the Al Mansour Melia
hotel in Baghdad.

That same day, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, joined by leaders of
four additional Islamic terrorist groups, announced the formation of the
World Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, soon to become better
known as al Qaeda. The grievances in the fatwa focused on Iraq. The
terrorist leaders decried the presence of U.S. troops on the Arabian
Peninsula. They protested the "great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi
people by the crusader-Zionist alliance." They cited American support for
Israel and surmised that the United States sought to distract world
attention from the killing of Muslims in Jerusalem. To support this claim,
the fatwa turned once again to Iraq: "The best proof of this is their
eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state."

The fatwa declared: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their
allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who
can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."

The al Qaeda envoy to Iraq arrived in Baghdad on March 5, 1998. Notes in the
margins of the Iraqi Intelligence memos indicate that Mohammed F. Mohammed
stayed for more than two weeks in Room 414 of the Al Mansour Melia Hotel as
the guest of Iraqi Intelligence. After extending his trip by one week, bin
Laden's emissary departed on March 16.
Adding to the intrigue, the 9/11 Commission reported that "[i]n March 1998,
after bin Laden's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda
members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence." Were there
two separate al Qaeda trips to Iraq in March 1998? It's possible that the
IIS documents and the 9/11 Commission report refer to the same meeting. But
the Iraqi Intelligence documents refer to one al Qaeda envoy, the 9/11
Commission report mentions two--raising the possibility that two separate
meetings took place.

* * *

"The consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al
Shifa. There were three different [chemical weapons] structures in the
Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no question that the Iraqis
were there."

Interview with John Gannon, former chairman of the CIA's National
Intelligence Council, October 25, 2004

OPEN SOURCE REPORTING suggests the relationship continued throughout the
spring and summer of 1998. William Safire of the New York Times and Yossef
Bodansky, former director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Warfare, have both reported the presence of an al Qaeda
delegation at a birthday celebration for Saddam Hussein in April 1998.

In a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy on May 22, 1998, President Clinton
warned that our enemies "may deploy compact and relatively cheap weapons of
mass destruction--not just nuclear, but also chemical or biological, to use
disease as a weapon of war. Sometimes the terrorists and criminals act
alone. But increasingly, they are interconnected, and sometimes supported by
hostile countries." Hostile countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan.

Although Osama bin Laden left Sudan in 1996, many al Qaeda operatives stayed
behind. According to testimony from several al Qaeda terrorists now in U.S.
custody, al Qaeda operatives worked closely with Sudanese intelligence.
Sudanese intelligence provided security for al Qaeda camps and safehouses.
These agents intervened when local Sudanese authorities arrested al Qaeda
members for exploding bombs at an al Qaeda farm, securing the release of the
detained terrorists. Jamal al Fadl, an al Qaeda terrorist who later
cooperated with U.S. prosecutors, testified that he was ordered by Sudanese
intelligence to assassinate a political rival to Hassan al-Turabi. Even
after bin Laden's departure, al Qaeda and Sudanese intelligence were
virtually indistinguishable.

Shortly after Clinton's speech, the CIA produced an assessment of WMD
proliferation that covered the first half of 1998. "Sudan," it said, "has
been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years.
In this pursuit, Sudan obtained help from other countries, principally Iraq.
Given its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq,
Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well." CIA assessments through
2002 included similar analyses.
In July 1998, according to the 9/11 Commission report, "an Iraqi delegation
traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with bin
Laden." Referring to the March and July meetings between Iraq and al Qaeda,
the Commission noted that "sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of
these meetings was apparently arranged through bin Laden's Egyptian deputy,
Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis." In a maddening omission,
the report does not elaborate on the "ties" between al Qaeda's No. 2 and the
Iraqi regime.

Trouble was clearly brewing. On July 29, the CIA's Counterterrorism Center
(CTC) warned of "possible Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear
(CBRN) attack by UBL [Osama bin Laden]." But when the attack came, it was by
conventional means: On August 7, al Qaeda terrorists struck the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224--including 12 Americans--and
injuring more than 4,000. Almost immediately, the CIA assigned
responsibility to terrorists affiliated with Osama bin Laden.

The U.S. response came two weeks later, on August 20, striking two targets.
The first of these, al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, was
uncontroversial. The second target--the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in
Sudan--almost immediately gave rise to great controversy.

In justifying the strike on al Shifa, the Clinton administration pointed to
several pieces of evidence: a soil sample indicating the presence of a
precursor for VX nerve gas of Iraqi provenance; the presence of Iraqi
chemical weapons experts at the plant; the long history of Iraq-Sudanese
collaboration on chemical weapons; and telephone intercepts between senior
Shifa officials and Emad Al Ani, the father of Iraq's chemical weapons
program.

The press treated these claims with great skepticism. But Clinton
administration officials and many intelligence analysts would continue to
defend the intelligence surrounding al Shifa for years. In a January 23,
1999, article in the Washington Post, National Security Council
counterterrorism director Richard Clarke defended the president's choice of
target and said that "intelligence exists linking bin Laden to al Shifa's
current and past operators, the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National
Islamic Front in Sudan." In an email he sent on November 4, 1998, to
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Clarke concluded that the presence
of Iraqi chemical experts in Sudan was "probably a direct result of the
Iraq-Al Qaeda agreement."

President Clinton's secretary of defense, William Cohen, continued to defend
the decision to strike al Shifa before the 9/11 Commission last year. Cohen
explained that there were "multiple, reinforcing elements of information
ranging from links that the organization that built the facility [al Shifa]
had both with bin Laden and with the leadership of the Iraqi chemical
weapons program."

In an interview with THE WEEKLY STANDARD last fall, 9/11 Commission
co-chairman Thomas Kean said: "Top officials--Bill Clinton, Sandy Berger,
and others--told us with absolute certainty that there were chemical weapons
of mass destruction at that factory, and that's why we sent missiles." Kean
added: "We still can't say for certain that the chemicals were there. If
they're right and there was stuff there, then it had to come from Iraq.
They're the ones who had the stuff, who had this technology."

In fact, the Iraqis were openly involved with the al Shifa facility.
Sudanese foreign minister Osman Ismail was in Baghdad when the plant was
attacked. He told reporters the facility was nothing more than a
pharmaceutical factory. As proof he pointed to the existence of a contract
awarded to al Shifa through the U.N. Oil-for-Food program. But the contract
raised questions even then. In the eight months between the signing of the
$199,000 contract and the U.S. strikes on al Shifa, no goods were delivered.
With the benefit of hindsight, we now understand that Saddam Hussein
manipulated the Oil-for-Food program to reward friends and business partners
willing to help him circumvent U.N. sanctions and rebuild his weapons
programs. U.S. counterterrorism officials tell The Weekly Standard that
relatively few Oil-for-Food contracts went to Sudanese companies, and that
the contract with al Shifa stands out as troubling.

There was reporting about an Iraqi presence at a number of facilities in
Sudan. The Clinton administration chose al Shifa for destruction largely
because it was outside of Khartoum and was thus unlikely to result in a
large number of casualties. There were several other potential targets. "The
consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al
Shifa," says John Gannon, who was chairman of the National Intelligence
Council at the time. "There were three different [chemical weapons]
structures in the Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no
question that the Iraqis were there."

As for the August 1998 Iraq-al Qaeda plots against the U.S. and British
embassies in Pakistan, revealed in the Guantanamo Summary of Evidence
obtained by the AP, we are left with more questions than answers. Has the
detainee's story been corroborated? Were the attacks in Pakistan what the
CIA's counterterrorism center warned about on July 29? Were they to have
been carried out in tandem with the August 7, 1998, al Qaeda embassy
bombings? Were they intended as a rejoinder to the U.S. strikes on al Shifa?
A Pentagon spokesman says the government's policy against discussing
detainees prevents him from providing any answers. Other Bush administration
and intelligence officials contacted by The Weekly Standard either did not
know about the detainee or refused to discuss the case.

On August 27, 1998, Iraq's Babel newspaper, published by Uday Hussein,
labeled Osama bin Laden an "Arab and Islamic hero."

* * *

"Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sealed a pact."

Milan's Corriere della Sera, December 28, 1998, as cited in the Senate
Intelligence Committee report, p. 328

SADDAM HUSSEIN continued to defy U.N. weapons inspectors throughout the fall
of 1998. Noncompliance was the norm. Confrontations about access to
suspected WMD sites became almost a daily occurrence.

Back in Washington, members of both parties urged President Clinton to
increase the pressure on Iraq. Congress was considering legislation that
would make "regime change" in Iraq official U.S. policy. The United States
also began broadcasting anti-Hussein messages into Iraq via Radio Free Iraq.
The broadcasts were housed in the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
headquarters in Prague. The first broadcast went out on October 30, 1998.
The Iraqis were furious and threatened retaliation. On November 8, 1998, a
commentator on Iraqi state television insisted the broadcasts would do
nothing to affect the "jihad spirit" of the Iraqis. A statement three days
later from Saddam's Baath party called on Muslims to be steadfast in the
ongoing Mother of All Battles and to undertake "unprecedented heroisms" to
fight the Zionists and Crusaders. And then, a call for attacks:

All living capabilities of the Arab nation should be toward the unity of the
pan-Arab [world] and toward escalating the struggle to the highest levels of
jihad. . . . The escalation of the confrontation and the disclosure of its
dimensions and the aggressive intentions now require an organized, planned,
influential and conclusive enthusiasm against U.S. interests.
This was not, apparently, just bluster. The Iraqi regime wired $150,000 to
an account in Prague, according to Jabir Salim, the man on the receiving
end. Salim was the Iraqi station chief in the Czech Republic and with the
money he received an order: Recruit a young Islamic radical to blow up the
headquarters of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Salim had difficulty
finding someone to commit the martyrdom operation, he told British
Intelligence after defecting to the West when the U.S. launched Operation
Desert Fox--a series of cruise missile attacks on Iraqi targets--on December
16, 1998. Salim also told interrogators that the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship
had intensified after the August 1998 embassy bombings and that the Iraqi
Intelligence station in Pakistan served as the hub of Iraq-al Qaeda
activity.

Operation Desert Fox would last four days. Saddam Hussein's response was
revealing. On December 21, he dispatched one of his most trusted
intelligence operatives, Faruq Hijazi, to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden.
Hijazi had met with both Zawahiri and bin Laden on many occasions earlier in
the decade. On December 26, Osama bin Laden condemned the U.S.-led attacks.
"The British and the American people loudly declared their support for their
leaders' decision to attack Iraq," bin Laden proclaimed. He added that this
support made it the "duty of Muslims to confront, fight and kill" British
and American citizens.

The meeting between bin Laden and Hijazi instigated a burst of intelligence
reporting on Iraq and al Qaeda. One source reported that "the Iraqi regime
was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to
recruit Muslim 'elements' to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests."

These claims were not limited to sensitive intelligence reporting. In the
weeks that followed the meeting, dozens of press outlets from around the
world reported on it as well as several others. The reports indicated that
Saddam had offered bin Laden safe haven, had already trained al Qaeda
operatives, and was supporting bin Laden's efforts to attack Western
targets.

The details reported were striking. On December 28 Milan's Corriere della
Sera reported "Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sealed a pact." In
its issue dated January 11, 1999, Newsweek quoted an anonymous "Arab
intelligence officer who knows Saddam personally" as warning that "very soon
you will be witnessing large-scale terrorist activity run by the Iraqis"
against Western targets. The Iraqi plan would be run under one of three
"false flags": Palestinian, Iranian, and the "al Qaeda apparatus." All of
these groups, Newsweek reported, had representatives in Baghdad.

The reports did not end there. Throughout February and March 1999, there was
media speculation that bin Laden would relocate from Afghanistan to Iraq.
Behind the scenes, Clinton administration officials were engaging in similar
conjecture. According to the 9/11 Commission report, Richard Clarke sent an
email to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger on February 11, 1999. Clarke
told Berger that if bin Laden learned of U.S. operations against him, "old
wily Osama will likely boogie to Baghdad." Days later Bruce Riedel of the
National Security Council staff also emailed Berger, warning that "Saddam
Hussein wanted bin Laden in Baghdad." Reports of Iraqi offers of safe haven,
cooperation, and training continued throughout 1999.

* * *

"The Shakir in Kuala Lumpur has many interesting connections that are so
multiple in their intersections with al Qaeda-related organizations and
people as to suggest something more than random chance."
9/11 Commissioner John Lehman, July 22, 2004

TWO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES believe that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi
national who escorted a September 11 hijacker to the key planning meeting
for those attacks in Kuala Lumpur, was working for Iraqi Intelligence: the
Malaysians, who monitored Shakir's activities as he facilitated the travel
for 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar in January 2000, and the Jordanians, who
detained Shakir for three months after the September 11 attacks.
Shakir began working as a VIP greeter for Malaysian Airlines in August 1999.
He told associates he had gotten the job through a contact at the Iraqi
embassy named Ra'ad al-Mudaris. In fact, al-Mudaris controlled Shakir's
schedule--telling him when to report to work and when to take a day off. The
Senate Intelligence Committee report reveals that "another source claimed
that Mudaris was a former IIS officer."

Al-Mudaris apparently told Shakir to report to work on January 5, 2000, the
same day September 11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar arrived in Kuala Lumpur.
Shakir escorted al Mihdhar to a waiting car and then, rather than bid his
guest farewell, jumped in the car with him. U.S. intelligence officials will
not say whether Shakir was an active participant in the meeting, but with
photographs provided by Malaysian intelligence, there is little doubt he was
there. The meeting lasted from January 5 to January 8. Shakir reported to
work twice after the meeting broke up and then disappeared.

He was arrested in Doha, Qatar, on September 17, 2001. He had been employed
by the Qatari government in its Ministry of Religious Development.
Authorities found what Newsweek's Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman
described as a "treasure trove": contact information--both on Shakir and
back at his apartment--for several high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists. They
include: Zaid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed; Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, the Iraqi who
participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; Abu Hajer al Iraqi, the
Iraqi national alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's "best friend"; and
Ibrahim Suleiman, a Kuwaiti native whose fingerprints were found on the
bombmaking manuals authorities say were used in preparation for the 1993
Trade Center bombing. We also know that in January 1993, shortly before the
first attack on the World Trade Center, Shakir had received a phone call
later traced to the New Jersey safehouse that served as the headquarters for
that operation.
Despite this, the Qataris released Shakir. (The Qatari government has not
responded to numerous interview requests.) But he was detained again on
October 21, 2001, this time by Jordanians in Amman, where he was to have
caught a flight to Baghdad. The Jordanians held him for three months. The
Iraqi regime repeatedly contacted the Jordanian government and pressed for
his release. The Jordanians, who had concluded that Shakir was working for
Iraqi Intelligence, devised a plan and presented it to the CIA. The
Jordanians proposed releasing Shakir, but only after extracting from him a
promise to report back on the activities of Iraqi Intelligence from inside
Iraq. Perhaps mindful of the woeful lack of human sources in Iraq, the CIA
approved. The Jordanians set him free in late January 2002, at which point
he returned to Baghdad.
He was never heard from again.

The Weekly Standard asked 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman about Shakir last
year, shortly after the commission's final report was released. "The Shakir
in Kuala Lumpur has many interesting connections that are so multiple in
their intersections with al Qaeda-related organizations and people as to
suggest something more than random chance," he said. We clarified: "With
respect to both al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime?"

"Yes. Both."

* * *

"Following the expulsion of al Qaeda from Afghanistan and their arrival in
northern Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (a senior al Qaeda figure) was
relatively free to travel within Iraq proper and to stay in Baghdad for some
time. Several of his colleagues visited him there."

The Butler Report, July 14, 2004

TEN DAYS BEFORE September 11, 2001, a small group of Islamic radicals came
together in the northern, Kurdish-controlled area of Iraq. They would
quickly come to be known as Ansar al Islam. Their ranks swelled as hundreds
of al Qaeda terrorists fled the U.S. assault on the Taliban in Afghanistan.
It quickly became clear to many policymakers and intelligence analysts that
the Ansar camps were fallback zones for al Qaeda.

In time, one of Ansar's leaders would become the face of not only the Iraqi
insurgency, but also of al Qaeda. Abu Musab al Zarqawi is, besides Osama bin
Laden, perhaps the best known al Qaeda terrorist on the planet. He and his
followers have been linked to terrorist plots the world over: from a plot in
Jordan at the turn of the millennium, to the assassination of U.S. diplomat
Laurence Foley in October 2002, to the Madrid train bombing on March 11,
2004. His personal role in the beheadings of hostages in Iraq has provided a
stark reminder of the brutality of the jihadists.

As the war in Iraq approached, the Bush administration cited Zarqawi's
presence in Baghdad from May to July 2002--allegedly, for medical
treatment--as evidence that Saddam harbored and aided al Qaeda terrorists.
This claim was met with a remarkable degree of skepticism.

Prior to September 11, there was nary a mention of Zarqawi. It appears that
the intelligence community did not pay much attention to him until after
9/11, when, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, "an
ongoing collection" became "aggressively worked." Thus, there is much
uncertainty concerning his origins and exactly when his relationship with
Saddam's regime began.

Recently, Ayad Allawi, the first post-Saddam prime minister of Iraq, stated
that Iraqi intelligence documents show that Zarqawi was in Saddam-controlled
parts of Iraq in late 1999. The documents, according to Allawi, also show
that Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells with the full knowledge of
Saddam's intelligence services. If the documents are authentic, and we
cannot offer a judgment one way or another, then they will put to rest any
doubts about Zarqawi's involvement with Saddam's regime prior to the war.

There were many early reports that Iraqi intelligence officers were among
Ansar's leadership and thus Zarqawi's cohorts. One of these was a man known
by his nom de guerre, Abu Wael. Ansar's Kurdish enemies, and several IIS and
al Qaeda detainees, claimed from the beginning that Abu Wael was an Iraqi
Intelligence officer who managed the relationship between Ansar and Saddam's
regime. The Kurds have also repeatedly claimed that he, as well as other IIS
officers, supplied Ansar with funding and arms.

The case of Abu Wael remains unresolved, but the Kurds' claims that the
Iraqi regime provided al Qaeda members with weapons and funding has been
validated by other intelligence reporting. A May 2002 signals intelligence
report, included in the Feith memo, stated that "an Iraqi intelligence
official, praising Ansar al Islam, provided it with $100,000 and agreed to
continue to give assistance." Another report from the National Security
Agency in October 2002 said that "al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret
agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and
provide them with money and weapons." It was this agreement that "reportedly
prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq."

In addition to Saddam's support for al Qaeda in Kurdish-controlled
territories, we also know that Zarqawi was not alone in Baghdad. According
to the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Report, the CIA "described a network
of more than a dozen al Qaeda or al Qaeda-associated operatives in Baghdad"
before the war.

The intelligence community has downplayed the possibility that the Iraqi
regime supported Zarqawi's prewar activities, including the assassination of
Laurence Foley. Intelligence community analysts, according to the Senate
Intelligence Committee report, point out that "neither of the two suspects"
in the shooting "provided any information on links between al-Zarqawi and
the Iraqi regime."

But we also have testimony from one of the suspects in the murder that
Zarqawi "directed and financed the operations of the cell" responsible
"before, during and after his stint in Baghdad between May and July 2002."
And both of the suspects have said that "one member of the al Zarqawi
network traveled repeatedly between regime-controlled Iraq and Syria after
March 2002."

Thus, many in the intelligence community implausibly assume that Zarqawi
could have planned terrorist attacks from neo-Stalinist Baghdad and had one
of his operatives travel in and out of Iraqi regime-controlled territory
without Saddam's approval. The next question is obvious: If it is so easy
for regime foes to maintain a long-term presence in Baghdad and to transit
in and out of Iraq, why was it so difficult for the CIA to operate there?
This assumption flies in the face of everything we know about Saddam and his
control over Iraq.

* * *

"The CIA had no [redacted] credible reporting on the leadership of either
the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda, which would have enabled it to better define a
cooperative relationship, if any did in fact exist. As a result, the CIA
refrained from asserting that Iraq and al Qaeda had cooperated on terrorist
attacks."

Senate Intelligence Committee report, July 7, 2004

THE CONCLUSION of the Senate Intelligence Committee report--that the CIA did
not have the type of intelligence reporting that "would have enabled it to
better define a cooperative relationship"--was ignored by the press. We now
have reporting that demonstrates the nature of the relationship. One day
there will be much more. At a large warehouse in Doha, Qatar, the Defense
Intelligence Agency is reviewing millions of pages of documents from the
former Iraqi regime. That process is painfully slow due to a lack of
resources and a lack of interest in pursuing the full story of Iraqi support
for terrorism.

That lack of interest is not new. As the anonymous intelligence analyst told
the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I don't think we were really focused on
the CT [counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the IIS
going out and pro-actively conducting terrorist attacks." That the
intelligence community did not pay particular attention to Saddam Hussein's
terrorist aspirations created a sizable blind spot.

Why wouldn't Saddam Hussein conduct terrorist attacks against U.S.
interests? The United States regularly bombed targets in Iraq--at times
almost daily--in support of the no-fly zones. We conducted more significant
attacks in January and June 1993, and again in 1996 and 1998. The CIA
attempted to foment a coup in 1996. The U.N. sanctions sought to deprive
Saddam of the resources he needed to sustain a robust military. The weapons
inspections occupied his top officials and hundreds of intelligence
officers. From 1998 forward, after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act,
the official policy of the United States was to end his regime. With that
policy came support of Iraqi opposition groups who existed to remove him
from power. For Saddam, then, the Gulf war never ended. He routinely accused
the United States of "terrorism" and "genocide." The state-run Iraqi media
threatened to exact revenge for more than a decade.

Further, Saddam had proven his willingness to use asymmetric means of
retaliation time and again. He attempted to use his own intelligence service
and terrorist surrogates against the United States during the first Gulf
war. He assisted a fugitive from the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. He
attempted to assassinate George H.W. Bush. He sought to blow up the U.S.
government's Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters. He openly
supported terrorist activity in the region. "From 1996 to 2003," according
to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, "the IIS focused its terrorist
activities on western interests, particularly against the U.S. and Israel."

We know that in the context of a decade-long confrontation with the United
States, Saddam reached out to al Qaeda on numerous occasions. We know that
the leadership of al Qaeda reciprocated, requesting assistance in its
endeavors. We know that reports of meetings, offers of safe haven, and
collaboration persisted.

What we do not know is the full extent of the relationship. But we know
enough to know that there was one. And we know enough to know it was a
threat.

Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard and author of The
Connection (HarperCollins). Thomas Joscelyn is an economist and writer
living in New York.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78132 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 16:28

Morgil

Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...
>"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:datlla$fqf$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...
>
>> >So -- and nonanswer predicted -- do you think a majority of Iraqis wish
>> >that
>> >Saddam were still in power?
>
>> No, but that's mostly because they know that if Saddam was still
>> in power, the Americans would continue to punish them all with
>> sanctions and random bombings, etc.
>
>Finally, the lunatic answers the question. You claim that the Iraqis would
>be better off if Saddam were still in power, yet you concede that the
>majority of Iraqis would disagree with you.

Wrong. There is no reason why Iraqis would not be both happy
that Saddam is gone, and yet realise that things have not really
improved since his departure.

>Why should we believe you over the Iraqis? Do you live in Iraq?

You seem to have snipped, probably by accident, most
of the things you were unable to answer. Here it is again:

Now answer these questions, you dodging coward.

Are the majority of Iraqis doing any better since Saddam was
removed from power?

Do you think that the majority of Iraqis think that they would be
better off if America had just left them alone?

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78133 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 16:43

"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:datvao$s6g$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...
> Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...

> >Finally, the lunatic answers the question. You claim that the Iraqis
would
> >be better off if Saddam were still in power, yet you concede that the
> >majority of Iraqis would disagree with you.

> Wrong. There is no reason why Iraqis would not be both happy
> that Saddam is gone, and yet realise that things have not really
> improved since his departure.

> >Why should we believe you over the Iraqis? Do you live in Iraq?

Nonanswer noted.

> You seem to have snipped, probably by accident, most
> of the things you were unable to answer. Here it is again:
>
> Now answer these questions, you dodging coward.
>
> Are the majority of Iraqis doing any better since Saddam was
> removed from power?
>
> Do you think that the majority of Iraqis think that they would be
> better off if America had just left them alone?

What a tool. I *did* answer these questions moron. Re-read the post, you
witless dullard.

--Ty

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78135 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 17:16

Morgil

Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...
>"Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:datjbe$cb7$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...
>> Ty kirjoitti viestissä <1qrAe.299$Bo3.177 [at] newssvr11.news.prodigy.com>...
>
>> >Although I find the assertion fascinating. I wonder if he actually meant
>to
>> >say that a majority of Iraqis would be better off today if Saddam were
>> still
>> >in power.
>
>> Finally you begin to see the light. Amazing as it may sound,
>> yes they would.
>
>So the 80% of the Iraqi people who were systematically brutalized by Saddam
>and the Sunni Arab minority are worse off today than they'd be if Saddam
and
>his murderous sons were still in power?

Kurds already had autonomy even before the invasion, so it is really
just the Shias. And they are no better if not worse then before. And
contrary to what you may believe, Sunni Arabs are people too.

>Do you think that a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were still in
power?

Are you retarted? Is that your problem. Switch off the broken record.

>And what do you base this opinion on? Specifics please.
>
>> Amazing because it truly demonstrates how
>> badly the Americans screwed up the occupation. Security
>> situation has not improved one inch from what it was before
>> the invasion
>
>Evidence?

Recent statement by none other then Donald Rumsfeld that the
security situation in Iraq has statistically not improved since 2003.

>> the average nutrition level has gone down
>
>Credible, specific evidence that it is worse overall than it was under
>Saddam?

UN report states that the number of children suffering from malnutrition
has doubled since the end of the war.

>> most
>> people *still* get electric power on irregular basis.
>
>Credible, specific evidence that it is worse overall than it was under
>Saddam?

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002348646 _iraqresent26.ht
ml

"And with the temperature exceeding 100 degrees, as it has every day for
weeks, people voiced anger at the prospect of spending their third summer
since the U.S.-led invasion with intermittent electricity. Those with
generators will be able to power air conditioners and other appliances; the
rest will simply bake in the intense heat."

>> ...100000 people who wouldn't have to be, are dead.
>
>A number that is not conceded. But even if it were, it compares favorably
to
>the ~30,000 that Saddam killed on average each year...

A number that is not conceded either. But even so, the number
of the casualities today keeps climbing up steadily as well.

>> So now that you know the bitter truth, answer this...
>
>No, you have only made bald assertions and you *still* refuse to answer the
>question that I have asked 10+ times.
>
>Do you think that a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were still in
power?

Are you retarted? Is that your problem. Switch off the broken record.

>Answer the question please.
>
>> Don't you think the Iraqis would have been better off without USA?
>
>Of course not.

Too bad the Iraqis don't agree with you. *They* still remember who
supported Saddam during the war on Iran, who betrayed them in
the Shiite uprising, who crippled them with sanctions for 10 years
and who has now brought them even more misery and suffering.

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78146 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 20:50

nopspam

"Ty" <tybeardSPAM [at] sbcglobal.net> wrote in
news:fPcAe.36$zw4.12 [at] newssvr12.news.prodigy.com:

> "Yuk Tang" <jimlaker2 [at] yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:Xns968F60736D507yos132000yahoocouk [at] 195.92.193.157...
>> http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article298109.ece
>>
>> Britain's top Muslim scholars are to issue a "fatwa" which will
>> condemn the terrorists behind Thursday's bombings, in an
>> unprecedented move to repudiate the Islamist militants suspected of
>> the atrocities.
>
>> It is expected that the religious ruling, which will be drafted this
>> week, will effectively outlaw the bombers among Muslims by stating
>> the attacks were a breach of the most basic tenets of Islam.
>
> Gee, I wonder why they haven't included Muslim suicide bombers who
> attack Israel in the fatwa? And for that matter, I wonder why they
> took so long to condemn Muslim terrorist attacks against other Western
> nations?

Yeah, it's really disappointing this British fatwa.

>> Senior community leaders believe they must try to deflect another
>> wave of revenge attacks by undermining the religious basis of the
>> terrorists' alleged Islamist ideology and, significantly, by
>> questioning their right to describe themselves as Muslims

So here comes one big PERHAPS that we feel more comfortable with:

> Or perhaps they are simply trying to manipulate gullible Western
> lefties into continuing to support Muslim extremism?

Aah, that felt better. Nothings gonna change my world.

--
Mästerkatten

"If the best you can do is lame excuses
and obfuscations, you will never escape
the fantasy world in which you are totally
enmeshed"

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78150 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 21:36

Christopher Kreuzer

"Ty" <tybeardSPAM [at] sbcglobal.net> wrote

<snip>

> So - do you think a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were
> still in power?

Could you go on a fact-finding mission to Iraq and find out for us,
please? Take your time.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78151 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 21:55

Morgil

Christopher Kreuzer kirjoitti viestissä ...
>"Ty" <tybeardSPAM [at] sbcglobal.net> wrote
>
><snip>
>
>> So - do you think a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were
>> still in power?
>
>Could you go on a fact-finding mission to Iraq and find out for us,
>please? Take your time.

Interestingly whenever majority of Americans say that they don't
wish for Bush to be in power anymore, it always gets dismissed
as meaningless criticism by the likes of Ty...

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #78152 ]

Mo, 11 Juli 2005 22:13

the softrat

On Mon, 11 Jul 2005 08:31:59 +0300, "Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com>
wrote:

>
>Pat kirjoitti viestissä ...
>
>>Bush *IS* Morgoth! or, at the least, Sauron.
>
>Naah, that's going too far. He's more sort of a mixture of
>Saruman, Feanor and the later Numenorean Kings. :-)
>
>Morgil
>
How about "Celeborn on drugs"?

the softrat
"Honi soit qui mal y pense."
mailto:softrat [at] pobox.com
--
A little rudeness and disrespect can elevate a meaningless
interaction to a battle of wills and add drama to an otherwise
dull day.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79526 ]

Di, 12 Juli 2005 14:21

Morgil

Ty wrote:
> "Morgil" <morestelx [at] hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:datvao$s6g$1 [at] phys-news1.kolumbus.fi...
>
>>Ty kirjoitti viestissä ...
>
>
>>>Finally, the lunatic answers the question. You claim that the Iraqis
>
> would
>
>>>be better off if Saddam were still in power, yet you concede that the
>>>majority of Iraqis would disagree with you.
>
>
>>Wrong. There is no reason why Iraqis would not be both happy
>>that Saddam is gone, and yet realise that things have not really
>>improved since his departure.
>
>
>>>Why should we believe you over the Iraqis? Do you live in Iraq?
>
>
> Nonanswer noted.

Liar. I did answer the question.

"There is no reason why Iraqis would not be both happy
that Saddam is gone, and yet realise that things have not really
improved since his departure."

>>You seem to have snipped, probably by accident, most
>>of the things you were unable to answer. Here it is again:
>>
>>Now answer these questions, you dodging coward.
>>
>>Are the majority of Iraqis doing any better since Saddam was
>>removed from power?
>>
>>Do you think that the majority of Iraqis think that they would be
>>better off if America had just left them alone?
>
>
> What a tool. I *did* answer these questions moron. Re-read the post, you
> witless dullard.

Nonanswer noted.

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79527 ]

Di, 12 Juli 2005 14:22

Morgil

Ty wrote:
> "Pat" <pk [at] primenet.com> wrote in message
> news:5lr3d11i69a421igi9cbvh96l2bm24a8g4 [at] 4ax.com...

>>Pray tell, what was the national interest served by invading Iraq?
>
> Creation
>
>>of terrorist training camps, plenty of those in Iraq now, of course none
>>before the war?
>
>
> Asked and answered. A search of this newsgroup will turn up numerous posts
> on that topic in which I outline in great detail my response. I am simply
> not interested in rehashing that with you again.

Nonanswer noted.

Morgil

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79553 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 01:08

Flame of the West

Yuk Tang wrote:

> A 1997?

Well, yes. Of course, our Democrats are nothing but faint echoes
of the Republicans - neither wants to get us out of Iraq until
the insurgency is completely put down. But sooner or later the
voters will just throw out the GOP even if the Democrats are no
better.

> Except that Thatcherites still seem to rule the Conservative
> party. There's a used-to-be and would-be ruling elite that wants to
> move leftwards towards the more electable centre, but the party
> members won't let them. Michael Howard is currently trying to
> arrange it so that this elite can pick a sensible candidate who can
> reach out to non-Tories, but the rightwing candidate and his
> supporters (the bulk of the party) are disgruntled at not being
> allowed a general vote.

I thought the Tories' problem was not so much left vs. right
as their postion on integration into Europe. After all, they
aren't any more conservative than they were under Lady Thatcher,
are they?

-- FotW

On the Internet, no one can tell you're an Ent.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79554 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 01:53

Yuk Tang

Flame of the West <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote in
news:YLqdnaUTRt330EnfRVn-tw [at] comcast.com:
> Yuk Tang wrote:
>
>> A 1997?
>
> Well, yes. Of course, our Democrats are nothing but faint echoes
> of the Republicans - neither wants to get us out of Iraq until
> the insurgency is completely put down. But sooner or later the
> voters will just throw out the GOP even if the Democrats are no
> better.
>
>> Except that Thatcherites still seem to rule the Conservative
>> party. There's a used-to-be and would-be ruling elite that wants
>> to move leftwards towards the more electable centre, but the
>> party members won't let them. Michael Howard is currently trying
>> to arrange it so that this elite can pick a sensible candidate
>> who can reach out to non-Tories, but the rightwing candidate and
>> his supporters (the bulk of the party) are disgruntled at not
>> being allowed a general vote.
>
> I thought the Tories' problem was not so much left vs. right
> as their postion on integration into Europe. After all, they
> aren't any more conservative than they were under Lady Thatcher,
> are they?

The Tory party imploded over Europe, but it's Thatcher's legacy and
her infamous statement that "there is no such thing as society" that
will prevent them from regaining power. There are certain areas of
government that the Great British Public wants to pump money into,
and Brown has identified them and propagandised his input to
perfection. The Tories try to compete on that front, but they also
advocate tax cuts, and the GBP are no fools: they can see that tax
cuts plus investment in some services means massive spending cuts
elsewhere. So they fall back on the old ideological divide of
Conservatives equals tax cuts, Labour equals public services, and
they go for Labour.

Actually, although Brown has propagandised his efforts brilliantly,
Blair's poisonous domestic image and tendency to the right has meant
that the Labour government as a whole hasn't benefited as much as it
might have done. The infighting between the Blairites and the
Brownites doesn't help much either.

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79571 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 07:20

Flame of the West

Ty wrote:

> So - do you think a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were still in power?

This is really the wrong question. The peoples of China,
North Korea, and Iran certainly would welcome a change
of government, but it's not our business to go around
overthrowing governments just because their peoples
don't like them. That isn't our job. Our armed forces
are there to protect our country, not to impose our
political model on others.

-- FotW

On the Internet, no one can tell you're an Orc
(but they can tell if you're a Troll).

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79572 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 07:27

Flame of the West

Yuk Tang wrote:

> The Tory party imploded over Europe, but it's Thatcher's legacy and
> her infamous statement that "there is no such thing as society" that
> will prevent them from regaining power. There are certain areas of
> government that the Great British Public wants to pump money into,
> and Brown has identified them and propagandised his input to
> perfection. The Tories try to compete on that front, but they also
> advocate tax cuts, and the GBP are no fools: they can see that tax
> cuts plus investment in some services means massive spending cuts
> elsewhere. So they fall back on the old ideological divide of
> Conservatives equals tax cuts, Labour equals public services, and
> they go for Labour.

But what's difference between today and the Thatcher era?
Why are they losing on the same platform they won with
in those days? Has the GBP changed somehow?

-- FotW

On the Internet, no one can tell you're a Vala.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79578 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 09:47

Christopher Kreuzer

Flame of the West <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote:

<snip>

> But what's difference between today and the Thatcher era?
> Why are they losing on the same platform they won with
> in those days? Has the GBP changed somehow?

It's the leaders, IMO, though I don't see it personally. Though I was
too young to vote for Thatcher, archive footage of her sets my teeth on
edge in the same way as Blair does. In fact, unlike the vast majority, I
actually liked that other PM we had, that John Major chap. But then he
played cricket.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79580 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 11:10

Yuk Tang

"Christopher Kreuzer" <spamgard [at] blueyonder.co.uk> wrote in
news:wG3Be.68683$G8.41550 [at] text.news.blueyonder.co.uk:
> Flame of the West <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>> But what's difference between today and the Thatcher era?
>> Why are they losing on the same platform they won with
>> in those days? Has the GBP changed somehow?
>
> It's the leaders, IMO, though I don't see it personally. Though I
> was too young to vote for Thatcher, archive footage of her sets my
> teeth on edge in the same way as Blair does. In fact, unlike the
> vast majority, I actually liked that other PM we had, that John
> Major chap. But then he played cricket.

I actually rather like the 'big beasts' in Major's cabinet (including
Major himself), and would have no problem voting for them in my
constituency. The problem is that the Thatcherite rump do not see
compromise as part of politics, and seem to believe that merely
stating their case is enough, rather than trying to persuade people.
That kind of give-but-no-take politics gave us the poll tax (what
really did for Thatcher).

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT Islamic leaders will issue 'fatwa' on terrorists [message #79581 ]

Mi, 13 Juli 2005 11:16

Yuk Tang

Flame of the West <jsolinas [at] comcast.net> wrote in
news:aMSdnbwTTtAbOUnfRVn-tA [at] comcast.com:
> Ty wrote:
>
>> So - do you think a majority of Iraqis wish that Saddam were
>> still in power?
>
> This is really the wrong question. The peoples of China,
> North Korea, and Iran certainly would welcome a change
> of government, but it's not our business to go around
> overthrowing governments just because their peoples
> don't like them. That isn't our job. Our armed forces
> are there to protect our country, not to impose our
> political model on others.

On this side of the water, we'd call that the distinguishing feature of
a Trot, seeking to spread ideology (Communism in their case) to other
countries. They're among the lowest life forms in the eyes of the
moderate left, far below the Tories and only just above the far right.

--
Cheers, ymt.

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