OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story

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Fantasy » alt.fan.tolkien » OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story

OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #184605]

Fr, 16 Dezember 2005 16:38

onq

Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story

It's a David and Goliath story of the tech blogs defeating a
mega-corporation.

On Oct. 31, Mark Russinovich broke the story in his blog: Sony BMG Music
Entertainment distributed a copy-protection scheme with music CDs that
secretly installed a rootkit on computers. This software tool is run
without your knowledge or consent -- if it's loaded on your computer with
a CD, a hacker can gain and maintain access to your system and you
wouldn't know it.

The Sony code modifies Windows so you can't tell it's there, a process
called "cloaking" in the hacker world. It acts as spyware,
surreptitiously sending information about you to Sony. And it can't be
removed; trying to get rid of it damages Windows.

This story was picked up by other blogs (including mine), followed by the
computer press. Finally, the mainstream media took it up.

The outcry was so great that on Nov. 11, Sony announced it was
temporarily halting production of that copy-protection scheme. That still
wasn't enough -- on Nov. 14 the company announced it was pulling
copy-protected CDs from store shelves and offered to replace customers'
infected CDs for free.

But that's not the real story here.

It's a tale of extreme hubris. Sony rolled out this incredibly invasive
copy-protection scheme without ever publicly discussing its details,
confident that its profits were worth modifying its customers' computers.
When its actions were first discovered, Sony offered a "fix" that didn't
remove the rootkit, just the cloaking.

Sony claimed the rootkit didn't phone home when it did. On Nov. 4, Thomas
Hesse, Sony BMG's president of global digital business, demonstrated the
company's disdain for its customers when he said, "Most people don't even
know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?" in an NPR
interview. Even Sony's apology only admits that its rootkit "includes a
feature that may make a user's computer susceptible to a virus written
specifically to target the software."

However, imperious corporate behavior is not the real story either.

This drama is also about incompetence. Sony's latest rootkit-removal tool
actually leaves a gaping vulnerability. And Sony's rootkit -- designed to
stop copyright infringement -- itself may have infringed on copyright. As
amazing as it might seem, the code seems to include an open-source MP3
encoder in violation of that library's license agreement. But even that
is not the real story.

It's an epic of class-action lawsuits in California and elsewhere, and
the focus of criminal investigations. The rootkit has even been found on
computers run by the Department of Defense, to the Department of Homeland
Security's displeasure. While Sony could be prosecuted under U.S.
cybercrime law, no one thinks it will be. And lawsuits are never the
whole story.

This saga is full of weird twists. Some pointed out how this sort of
software would degrade the reliability of Windows. Someone created
malicious code that used the rootkit to hide itself. A hacker used the
rootkit to avoid the spyware of a popular game. And there were even calls
for a worldwide Sony boycott. After all, if you can't trust Sony not to
infect your computer when you buy its music CDs, can you trust it to sell
you an uninfected computer in the first place? That's a good question,
but -- again -- not the real story.

It's yet another situation where Macintosh users can watch, amused (well,
mostly) from the sidelines, wondering why anyone still uses Microsoft
Windows. But certainly, even that is not the real story.

The story to pay attention to here is the collusion between big media
companies who try to control what we do on our computers and
computer-security companies who are supposed to be protecting us.

Initial estimates are that more than half a million computers worldwide
are infected with this Sony rootkit. Those are amazing infection numbers,
making this one of the most serious internet epidemics of all time -- on
a par with worms like Blaster, Slammer, Code Red and Nimda.

What do you think of your antivirus company, the one that didn't notice
Sony's rootkit as it infected half a million computers? And this isn't
one of those lightning-fast internet worms; this one has been spreading
since mid-2004. Because it spread through infected CDs, not through
internet connections, they didn't notice? This is exactly the kind of
thing we're paying those companies to detect -- especially because the
rootkit was phoning home.

But much worse than not detecting it before Russinovich's discovery was
the deafening silence that followed. When a new piece of malware is
found, security companies fall over themselves to clean our computers and
inoculate our networks. Not in this case.

McAfee didn't add detection code until Nov. 9, and as of Nov. 15 it
doesn't remove the rootkit, only the cloaking device. The company admits
on its web page that this is a lousy compromise. "McAfee detects, removes
and prevents reinstallation of XCP." That's the cloaking code. "Please
note that removal will not impair the copyright-protection mechanisms
installed from the CD. There have been reports of system crashes possibly
resulting from uninstalling XCP." Thanks for the warning.

Symantec's response to the rootkit has, to put it kindly, evolved. At
first the company didn't consider XCP malware at all. It wasn't until
Nov. 11 that Symantec posted a tool to remove the cloaking. As of Nov.
15, it is still wishy-washy about it, explaining that "this rootkit was
designed to hide a legitimate application, but it can be used to hide
other objects, including malicious software."

The only thing that makes this rootkit legitimate is that a multinational
corporation put it on your computer, not a criminal organization.

You might expect Microsoft to be the first company to condemn this
rootkit. After all, XCP corrupts Windows' internals in a pretty nasty
way. It's the sort of behavior that could easily lead to system crashes
-- crashes that customers would blame on Microsoft. But it wasn't until
Nov. 13, when public pressure was just too great to ignore, that
Microsoft announced it would update its security tools to detect and
remove the cloaking portion of the rootkit.

Perhaps the only security company that deserves praise is F-Secure, the
first and the loudest critic of Sony's actions. And Sysinternals, of
course, which hosts Russinovich's blog and brought this to light.

Bad security happens. It always has and it always will. And companies do
stupid things; always have and always will. But the reason we buy
security products from Symantec, McAfee and others is to protect us from
bad security.

I truly believed that even in the biggest and most-corporate security
company there are people with hackerish instincts, people who will do the
right thing and blow the whistle. That all the big security companies,
with over a year's lead time, would fail to notice or do anything about
this Sony rootkit demonstrates incompetence at best, and lousy ethics at
worst.

Microsoft I can understand. The company is a fan of invasive copy
protection -- it's being built into the next version of Windows.
Microsoft is trying to work with media companies like Sony, hoping
Windows becomes the media-distribution channel of choice. And Microsoft
is known for watching out for its business interests at the expense of
those of its customers.

What happens when the creators of malware collude with the very companies
we hire to protect us from that malware?

We users lose, that's what happens. A dangerous and damaging rootkit gets
introduced into the wild, and half a million computers get infected
before anyone does anything.

Who are the security companies really working for? It's unlikely that
this Sony rootkit is the only example of a media company using this
technology. Which security company has engineers looking for the others
who might be doing it? And what will they do if they find one? What will
they do the next time some multinational company decides that owning your
computers is a good idea?

These questions are the real story, and we all deserve answers.

This essay originally appeared in Wired:
<http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html>
There are a lot of links in this essay. You can see them on Wired's
page. Or here:
<http://www.schneier.com/essay-094.html>

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #184616 ]

Sa, 17 Dezember 2005 17:23

matt

rootkit = first aid for ents !
"Michael O'Neill" <onq [at] bwahahaha.indigo.ie> wrote in message
news:43A2DF61.1EA6B6D6 [at] bwahahaha.indigo.ie...
> Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story
>
>
>
> It's a David and Goliath story of the tech blogs defeating a
> mega-corporation.
>
> On Oct. 31, Mark Russinovich broke the story in his blog: Sony BMG Music
> Entertainment distributed a copy-protection scheme with music CDs that
> secretly installed a rootkit on computers. This software tool is run
> without your knowledge or consent -- if it's loaded on your computer with
> a CD, a hacker can gain and maintain access to your system and you
> wouldn't know it.
>
> The Sony code modifies Windows so you can't tell it's there, a process
> called "cloaking" in the hacker world. It acts as spyware,
> surreptitiously sending information about you to Sony. And it can't be
> removed; trying to get rid of it damages Windows.
>
> This story was picked up by other blogs (including mine), followed by the
> computer press. Finally, the mainstream media took it up.
>
> The outcry was so great that on Nov. 11, Sony announced it was
> temporarily halting production of that copy-protection scheme. That still
> wasn't enough -- on Nov. 14 the company announced it was pulling
> copy-protected CDs from store shelves and offered to replace customers'
> infected CDs for free.
>
> But that's not the real story here.
>
> It's a tale of extreme hubris. Sony rolled out this incredibly invasive
> copy-protection scheme without ever publicly discussing its details,
> confident that its profits were worth modifying its customers' computers.
> When its actions were first discovered, Sony offered a "fix" that didn't
> remove the rootkit, just the cloaking.
>
> Sony claimed the rootkit didn't phone home when it did. On Nov. 4, Thomas
> Hesse, Sony BMG's president of global digital business, demonstrated the
> company's disdain for its customers when he said, "Most people don't even
> know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?" in an NPR
> interview. Even Sony's apology only admits that its rootkit "includes a
> feature that may make a user's computer susceptible to a virus written
> specifically to target the software."
>
> However, imperious corporate behavior is not the real story either.
>
> This drama is also about incompetence. Sony's latest rootkit-removal tool
> actually leaves a gaping vulnerability. And Sony's rootkit -- designed to
> stop copyright infringement -- itself may have infringed on copyright. As
> amazing as it might seem, the code seems to include an open-source MP3
> encoder in violation of that library's license agreement. But even that
> is not the real story.
>
> It's an epic of class-action lawsuits in California and elsewhere, and
> the focus of criminal investigations. The rootkit has even been found on
> computers run by the Department of Defense, to the Department of Homeland
> Security's displeasure. While Sony could be prosecuted under U.S.
> cybercrime law, no one thinks it will be. And lawsuits are never the
> whole story.
>
> This saga is full of weird twists. Some pointed out how this sort of
> software would degrade the reliability of Windows. Someone created
> malicious code that used the rootkit to hide itself. A hacker used the
> rootkit to avoid the spyware of a popular game. And there were even calls
> for a worldwide Sony boycott. After all, if you can't trust Sony not to
> infect your computer when you buy its music CDs, can you trust it to sell
> you an uninfected computer in the first place? That's a good question,
> but -- again -- not the real story.
>
> It's yet another situation where Macintosh users can watch, amused (well,
> mostly) from the sidelines, wondering why anyone still uses Microsoft
> Windows. But certainly, even that is not the real story.
>
> The story to pay attention to here is the collusion between big media
> companies who try to control what we do on our computers and
> computer-security companies who are supposed to be protecting us.
>
> Initial estimates are that more than half a million computers worldwide
> are infected with this Sony rootkit. Those are amazing infection numbers,
> making this one of the most serious internet epidemics of all time -- on
> a par with worms like Blaster, Slammer, Code Red and Nimda.
>
> What do you think of your antivirus company, the one that didn't notice
> Sony's rootkit as it infected half a million computers? And this isn't
> one of those lightning-fast internet worms; this one has been spreading
> since mid-2004. Because it spread through infected CDs, not through
> internet connections, they didn't notice? This is exactly the kind of
> thing we're paying those companies to detect -- especially because the
> rootkit was phoning home.
>
> But much worse than not detecting it before Russinovich's discovery was
> the deafening silence that followed. When a new piece of malware is
> found, security companies fall over themselves to clean our computers and
> inoculate our networks. Not in this case.
>
> McAfee didn't add detection code until Nov. 9, and as of Nov. 15 it
> doesn't remove the rootkit, only the cloaking device. The company admits
> on its web page that this is a lousy compromise. "McAfee detects, removes
> and prevents reinstallation of XCP." That's the cloaking code. "Please
> note that removal will not impair the copyright-protection mechanisms
> installed from the CD. There have been reports of system crashes possibly
> resulting from uninstalling XCP." Thanks for the warning.
>
> Symantec's response to the rootkit has, to put it kindly, evolved. At
> first the company didn't consider XCP malware at all. It wasn't until
> Nov. 11 that Symantec posted a tool to remove the cloaking. As of Nov.
> 15, it is still wishy-washy about it, explaining that "this rootkit was
> designed to hide a legitimate application, but it can be used to hide
> other objects, including malicious software."
>
> The only thing that makes this rootkit legitimate is that a multinational
> corporation put it on your computer, not a criminal organization.
>
> You might expect Microsoft to be the first company to condemn this
> rootkit. After all, XCP corrupts Windows' internals in a pretty nasty
> way. It's the sort of behavior that could easily lead to system crashes
> -- crashes that customers would blame on Microsoft. But it wasn't until
> Nov. 13, when public pressure was just too great to ignore, that
> Microsoft announced it would update its security tools to detect and
> remove the cloaking portion of the rootkit.
>
> Perhaps the only security company that deserves praise is F-Secure, the
> first and the loudest critic of Sony's actions. And Sysinternals, of
> course, which hosts Russinovich's blog and brought this to light.
>
> Bad security happens. It always has and it always will. And companies do
> stupid things; always have and always will. But the reason we buy
> security products from Symantec, McAfee and others is to protect us from
> bad security.
>
> I truly believed that even in the biggest and most-corporate security
> company there are people with hackerish instincts, people who will do the
> right thing and blow the whistle. That all the big security companies,
> with over a year's lead time, would fail to notice or do anything about
> this Sony rootkit demonstrates incompetence at best, and lousy ethics at
> worst.
>
> Microsoft I can understand. The company is a fan of invasive copy
> protection -- it's being built into the next version of Windows.
> Microsoft is trying to work with media companies like Sony, hoping
> Windows becomes the media-distribution channel of choice. And Microsoft
> is known for watching out for its business interests at the expense of
> those of its customers.
>
> What happens when the creators of malware collude with the very companies
> we hire to protect us from that malware?
>
> We users lose, that's what happens. A dangerous and damaging rootkit gets
> introduced into the wild, and half a million computers get infected
> before anyone does anything.
>
> Who are the security companies really working for? It's unlikely that
> this Sony rootkit is the only example of a media company using this
> technology. Which security company has engineers looking for the others
> who might be doing it? And what will they do if they find one? What will
> they do the next time some multinational company decides that owning your
> computers is a good idea?
>
> These questions are the real story, and we all deserve answers.
>
> This essay originally appeared in Wired:
> <http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html>
> There are a lot of links in this essay. You can see them on Wired's
> page. Or here:
> <http://www.schneier.com/essay-094.html>

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #184636 ]

Mo, 19 Dezember 2005 16:38

onq

matt wrote:
>
> rootkit = first aid for ents !

<snip>

Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you know...

M.

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188942 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 00:27

Speaking Clock

Michael O'Neill wrote:
> matt wrote:
>>
>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
>
> <snip>
>
> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
> know...

Took me a moment to twig ...
--
Speaking Clock

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188943 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 10:09

Troels Forchhammer

In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
<speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:
> Michael O'Neill wrote:
>> matt wrote:
>>>
>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
>>
>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
>> know...
>
> Took me a moment to twig ...

But now you're beaming with pride?

--
Troels Forchhammer
Valid e-mail is <t.forch(a)email.dk>

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188944 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 12:08

matt

....oak-ay...
"Troels Forchhammer" <Troels [at] ThisIsFake.invalid> wrote in message
news:Xns9732667C0533DT.Forch [at] 131.228.6.99...
> In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
> <speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:
>> Michael O'Neill wrote:
>>> matt wrote:
>>>>
>>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
>>>
>>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
>>> know...
>>
>> Took me a moment to twig ...
>
> But now you're beaming with pride?
>
> --
> Troels Forchhammer
> Valid e-mail is <t.forch(a)email.dk>
>

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188945 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 12:30

Yuk Tang

Troels Forchhammer <Troels [at] ThisIsFake.invalid> wrote in
news:Xns9732667C0533DT.Forch [at] 131.228.6.99:
> In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
> <speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:
>> Michael O'Neill wrote:
>>> matt wrote:
>>>>
>>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
>>>
>>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
>>> know...
>>
>> Took me a moment to twig ...
>
> But now you're beaming with pride?

I hope someone is logging all this.

--
Cheers, ymt.

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188946 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 16:34

Gregory Hernandez

"Yuk Tang" <>
> I hope someone is logging all this.
>

I certainly am. I'm reporting it to the proper authorities for pun-ishment

happy holidays

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188947 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 17:19

onq

Yuk Tang wrote:
>
> Troels Forchhammer <Troels [at] ThisIsFake.invalid> wrote in
> news:Xns9732667C0533DT.Forch [at] 131.228.6.99:
> > In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
> > <speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:
> >> Michael O'Neill wrote:
> >>> matt wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
> >>>
> >>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
> >>> know...
> >>
> >> Took me a moment to twig ...
> >
> > But now you're beaming with pride?
>
> I hope someone is logging all this.

I think you should leaf this thread alone.

M.

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188952 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 20:51

Christopher Kreuzer

matt <wickerman [at] gwelvor.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
> "Troels Forchhammer" <Troels [at] ThisIsFake.invalid> wrote in message
> news:Xns9732667C0533DT.Forch [at] 131.228.6.99...
>> In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
>> <speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:
>>> Michael O'Neill wrote:
>>>> matt wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
>>>>
>>>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
>>>> know...
>>>
>>> Took me a moment to twig ...
>>
>> But now you're beaming with pride?
>
> ...oak-ay...

Maybe Sony's bark is worse than their bite?

Yet another pun-tree; was: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188955 ]

Di, 20 Dezember 2005 23:11

Raven

"Michael O'Neill" <onq [at] bwahahaha.indigo.ie> skrev i en meddelelse
news:43A82F12.F970D0F4 [at] bwahahaha.indigo.ie...

> Yuk Tang wrote:

> > Troels Forchhammer <Troels [at] ThisIsFake.invalid> wrote in
> > news:Xns9732667C0533DT.Forch [at] 131.228.6.99:

> > > In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
> > > <speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:

> > >> Michael O'Neill wrote:

> > >>> matt wrote:

> > >>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !

> > >>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
> > >>> know...

> > >> Took me a moment to twig ...

> > > But now you're beaming with pride?

> > I hope someone is logging all this.

> I think you should leaf this thread alone.

Going nuts, are we? But I hope fir sure the Tamil punmaster will be
leafing through this thread soon, by oak, ash and thorn. Wood be too bad if
he missed it. (A toast furu.)

Annankákai.

Re: Yet another pun-tree; was: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188956 ]

Mi, 21 Dezember 2005 01:20

Natman

On Tue, 20 Dec 2005 23:11:37 +0100, "Raven"
<jonlennart.beck.god [at] damn.get2net.that.dk.spam> wrote:

>"Michael O'Neill" <onq [at] bwahahaha.indigo.ie> skrev i en meddelelse
>news:43A82F12.F970D0F4 [at] bwahahaha.indigo.ie...
>
>> Yuk Tang wrote:
>
>> > Troels Forchhammer <Troels [at] ThisIsFake.invalid> wrote in
>> > news:Xns9732667C0533DT.Forch [at] 131.228.6.99:
>
>> > > In message <news:40ott5F13etjhU1 [at] individual.net> "Speaking Clock"
>> > > <speaking_clock [at] despammed.com> enriched us with:
>
>> > >> Michael O'Neill wrote:
>
>> > >>> matt wrote:
>
>> > >>>> rootkit = first aid for ents !
>
>> > >>> Rootkits are a very specialized branch of knowledge I'll have you
>> > >>> know...
>
>> > >> Took me a moment to twig ...
>
>> > > But now you're beaming with pride?
>
>> > I hope someone is logging all this.
>
>> I think you should leaf this thread alone.
>
> Going nuts, are we? But I hope fir sure the Tamil punmaster will be
>leafing through this thread soon, by oak, ash and thorn. Wood be too bad if
>he missed it. (A toast furu.)
>
>Annankákai.
>
He may be a maste of tree-puns, and a wiz with computers, but his bark
is worse than his byte.

Re: Yet another pun-tree; was: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188974 ]

Mi, 21 Dezember 2005 21:30

Gregory Hernandez

"Natman" wrote:
[snip]
> He may be a maste of tree-puns, and a wiz with computers, but his bark
> is worse than his byte.

he is also a credible pun-dit

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #188977 ]

Mi, 21 Dezember 2005 21:45

Henriette

Gregory Hernandez schreef:

> "Yuk Tang" <>
> > I hope someone is logging all this.
> >
>
> I certainly am. I'm reporting it to the proper authorities for pun-ishme=
nt
>
Keep in mind that an oak is not felled with one blow!

> happy holidays

Prettige feestdagen - Gl=E6delig jul - Meilleurs voeux - Nollaig Shona
Duit - Season's Greetings

Henriette

Re: OT But Very Important Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story [message #189922 ]

Do, 22 Dezember 2005 10:44

Troels Forchhammer

In message
<news:1135197953.096687.90910 [at] o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com>
"Henriette" <heldenib [at] hotmail.com> enriched us with:
>
> Gregory Hernandez schreef:
>> "Yuk Tang" <>
>>> I hope someone is logging all this.
>>
>> I certainly am. I'm reporting it to the proper authorities for
>> pun-ishme nt
>
> Keep in mind that an oak is not felled with one blow!

From the ashes a fire shall be woken!

I'm afraid that our puns are getting a bit wooden, now.

>> happy holidays
>
> Prettige feestdagen - Glædelig jul - Meilleurs voeux - Nollaig
> Shona Duit - Season's Greetings

Feliz Navidad! Frohe Weihnacht!

(my, my -- aren't we clever <G>)

--
Troels Forchhammer
Valid e-mail is <t.forch(a)email.dk>

Elen síla lúmenn' omentielvo

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